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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION 
On April 23, 1974, Governor Robert D. Ray signed into law 
a bill, earlier passed by the Sixty-fifth General Assembly of 
the State of Iowa, which gives public sector employees the 
right to bargain collectively with their employers. This law, 
called the Iowa Public Employment Relations Act (Chapter 20, 
School Laws of Iowa), become effective on July 1, 1975. It is 
this law with which this study will deal. 
The Problem 
It was the purpose of this study to report what could be 
found in authoritative literature and through a survey research 
project as to whether or not there was a significant difference 
in the expected instructional and noninstructional outcomes of 
the Iowa Public Employment Relations Act between and among 
groups of randomly selected Iowa elementary teachers, secondary 
teachers, superintendents, and board members. 
More specifically this study attempted to determine: 
1. If there were significant differences in the expected 
instructional and noninstructional outcomes of the 
Iowa Public Employment Relations Act between and 
among groups of Iowa elementary teachers, secondary 
teachers, superintendents, and board members. 
2. If there were significant differences in expected 
instructional and noninstructional outcomes of the 
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Iowa Public Employment Relations Act between and 
among groups of Iowa elementary teachers, secondary 
teachers, superintendents, and board members in the 
twenty-five largest pupil enrollment school districts, 
except Des Moines, as compared to those from the 
twenty-five smallest pupil enrollment school districts. 
3. If there were significant differences in expected 
instructional and noninstructional outcomes of the 
Iowa Public Employment relations Act among Iowa 
elementary and secondary teachers relative to their 
differences in whether they are male or female, number 
of years of teaching experience, and whether the 
financial remuneration they receive from teaching is 
a primary or secondary source of family income. 
4. If there were differences in the expected long-range 
outcomes of the Iowa Public Employment Relations Act 
among Iowa teachers, superintendents, and board 
members relative to whether or not the school district 
of which they were a part had a formal teacher 
bargaining unit. 
5. If there were significant differences in expected 
instructional and noninstructional outcomes of the 
Iowa Public Eirç>loyinent Relations Act among superin­
tendents in the study relative to their differences 
in total years of experience as a school superintendent. 
3 
Need for the Study-
Teacher collective bargaining can be anticipated to have 
an impact upon the education that present and future genera­
tions of Iowa school children will receive. By ascertaining 
the expected instructional and noninstructional outcomes of 
teacher collective bargaining from the principal participants 
in this new venture, it may be possible to project the degree 
and direction of this impact. 
If board members and educators can gain some concept of 
the ultimate outcomes of teacher collective bargaining as a 
result of this study, perhaps it will be more feasible to 
determine the effect of each item bargained for upon future 
generations of Iowa school children. This will, perhaps, 
enable Iowa educators to more clearly see each item as part of 
the whole—the education of Iowa's children. 
The effect of teacher collective bargaining on curriculum 
and instruction is certainly an area which is of interest and 
concern to the citizens of Iowa. Ascertaining the effect that 
teacher collective bargaining may have on curriculum and 
instruction as perceived by teachers, superintendents and 
board members may help to subvert detrimental results later. 
Knowledge of expected outcomes of each of the bargaining 
factions may also help to prevent unnecessary confusion and 
frustration brought about by a lack of mutual understanding 
among the bargaining parties concerning one another's attitudes. 
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motives, and hopes relative to the collective bargaining 
process. 
Since teacher collective bargaining has impact upon public 
funds and a public institution, a further need for this study 
was to provide the public with insight into the possible degree 
and direction of this impact. This, perhaps, will enable the 
public to provide input into the bargaining process before 
issues upon which teachers and boards of education are negoti­
ating are ratified. 
Definition of Terms 
1. Collective bargaining - used in this study to identify the 
process by which teachcrs of a particular school district, 
through representatives which they have chosen, can nego­
tiate their terms of employment as a group with the board 
of education or its representative(s). Gardner (18, p. 14) 
defines collective bargaining as: 
. . .  a  p r o c e d u r e  w h e r e b y  d u l y  a u t h o r i z e d  
representatives of labor and management get 
together on an equal basis to exchange ideas 
and positions pertinent to the interests of 
both groups for development in good faith of 
a contractual agreement on operations of work 
to be performed for a specific period of time. 
Herring and Rossetti (25, p. 323) say: 
The function of negotiations, particularly as 
it relates to schools, is the resolution of 
differences between labor, the teachers, and 
management, the school board. The negotiators. 
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as representatives of these groups, are charged 
with the responsibility of defending their 
respective group's demands and standards, and 
of resolving intergroup conflict. 
This study will deal specifically with teacher collective 
bargaining as it is currently being implemented under the 
authority and regulation of the Iowa Public Employment 
Relations Act described in detail in Chapter Two. For the 
purposes of this study, the terms "collective negotiations" 
and "professional negotiations" will be considered 
synonymous with "collective bargaining." 
2. Expected outcomes - used in this study to identify the 
benefits and/or negative aspects which the participants in 
the study believe will accrue as a result of teacher 
collective bargaining. The expected outcomes considered 
in this study can generally be classified into two 
categories - instructional and noninstructional. 
3. Instructional outcomes - used in this study to identify 
issues which contain provisions covering working conditions 
which directly influence classroom practices (e.g., class 
size, maximum teaching hours, use of aides, school calender, 
textbook and curriculum review, teacher qualifications and 
evaluation, student discipline policies, the principal's 
role as the instructional leader of the school, and parent 
participation). 
4. Noninstructional outcomes - used in this study to identify 
issues which contain provisions covering salary and fringe 
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benefit issues and the relationship between and among the 
principal parties in the collective bargaining process 
(e.g./ teacher-principal relationships, teacher-board 
relationships, teacher-public relationships, grievance 
procedures, and job satisfaction for teachers, board 
members, and superintendents). 
5. Policy - used in this study to mean school district policy 
and the accompanying rules and regulations determined by 
the board of education and which have the force and effect 
of law within the confines of a particular school district. 
The authority for the establishment and enforcement of 
board policy comes from section 279.8 of the Iowa Code (43) 
which states in part: 
The board shall make rules for its own 
government and that of the directors, officers, 
teachers, and pupils, and for the care of the 
schoolhouse, grounds, and property of the school 
corporation, and aid in the enforcement of same, 
and acquire the performance of duties by said 
persons iicposed by law and the rules. 
6. Teirms of employment - used in this study to mean the 
specific obligations upon which the employing school 
district and teacher employees have agreed. These specific 
obligations include agreements as to salary, fringe 
benefits, length of contract, hours, leaves of absence, 
health and safety matters, evaluation procedures, pro­
cedures for staff reduction, and in-service training. 
Terms of employment could possibly also include such items 
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as class size, facility requirements, the teachers' role 
in curriculum development and policy making, although non-
mandatory items for bargaining in Iowa at this time (1977). 
7. Master contract - used in this study to mean the written 
document which delineates the terms of employment which 
have been agreed to through the collective bargaining 
procedure. 
Delimitations 
This study was limited to a description of the groups 
herein surveyed as being representative of like groups of 
public school teachers, superintendents and board members 
throughout the State of Iowa. No attempt will be made to make 
assunç>tions about the expected outcomes of the Iowa Public 
Employment Relations Act among teachers, superintendents and 
board members beyond those found in Iowa. 
There are limitations to a survey in terms of the yield of 
purely objective data. A specific attitude expressed on a 
survey of the type used in this study may be the result of a 
recent event in the respondent's experience which may have an 
effect upon the respondent's expressed attitude at the time of 
completing the survey but may actually not be a long term or 
highly valued attitude. Therefore, the time frame of the 
attitudes or expected outcomes data collected in this study is 
limited to the period of time used to complete the survey. 
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The expected outcomes of the respondents may, at any point in 
time since the administration of the survey, have been altered 
by the respondents' individual and collective experiences. 
Sources of Data 
Data for the review of literature was obtained primarily 
through the assistance of the Educational Resources Information 
Center (ERIC) and the Iowa Network For Obtaining Resource 
Materials for Schools (INFORMS). The Iowa Association of 
School Boards, Iowa Association of School Administrators, Iowa 
Association of Secondary School Principals, Iowa Association 
of Elementary School Principals, and Iowa Council of Area 
School Boards also provided assistance in obtaining data for 
the review of literature. 
The sxirvey instrument used to collect data for the study 
was developed with the assistance of students in a graduate 
course. Administration of School Personnel, at Iowa State 
University and field tested through a pilot study under the 
supervision of Dr. Anton J. Netusil. 
The number of individuals randomly selected for participa­
tion in the study consisted of twenty-five board members, 
twenty-five superintendents, and three hundred teachers from 
Iowa's twenty-five largest pupil enrollment school districts; 
and twenty-five board members, twenty-five superintendents, and 
three hundred teachers from Iowa's twenty-five smallest pupil 
enrollment school districts. 
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Administration of the survey to the randomly selected 
sample described above was via the U.S. mail. 
Organization of the Study 
This study was organized using the five chapter approach 
to reporting research through a dissertation. Chapter One was 
written so as to provide the reader with an overview of the 
specific problem undertaken by the researcher; Chapter Two was 
completed so as to provide the researcher the background neces­
sary to do the study; Chapter Three describes the manner in 
which the research was carried out, including data collection 
and treatment; Chapter Four contains both a tabular presenta­
tion and a narrative description of the findings of this study; 
and Chapter Five contains a summary of the findings, the 
researcher's conclusions about the study, and recommendations 
which were made as a result of the study. 
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CHAPTER II. REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
Introduction 
In recent years teachers' attitudes relative to the 
teacher-board of education relationship in establishing teacher 
salaries and working conditions have undergone some severe 
changes. Terms such as "collective bargaining" and "teacher 
strikes," which have now replaced such terms as "professional 
negotiations" and "withholding of services," would have been 
abhorrent in the minds of many teachers as recently as ten 
years ago. 
In this chapter the writer has reviewed the literature 
relative to the history of teacher collective bargaining in the 
United States, examined in some detail the Iowa Public 
Employees Relations Act, and reported what could be found in 
the literature relative to teachers', superintendents', and 
board members * expected outcomes of formalized teacher collec­
tive bargaining. 
Teachers' Unions 
Inherent to the right to bargain is the formation of a 
bargaining unit, which often implies that employees will form 
or belong to a labor union or professional association. Al­
though teachers have held membership in professional associa­
tions for many years, the relationship of teachers to labor 
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unions was for a period of time legally unclear. Teachers' 
right to union membership has not always been a legal preroga­
tive. In two landmark decisions, one in Chicago in 1917, 
(People ex rel Fursman v. City of Chicago, 278 111. 318, 116 
N.E. 158) and in Seattle in 1930, (Seattle High School Chapter 
No. 200 of the AFT v. Sharpies, 159 Wash. 424, 293 Pac, 994) 
board rules against union membership were upheld in the courts 
(34) . 
In the Chicago case the rule was upheld because . . it 
was inimical to the efficiency of the teaching force, and 
detrimental to the welfare of the public school system." The 
Chicago rule stated that teachers were not to be employed if 
they held union membership, and if teachers who were already 
employed violated the rule, they were subject to dismissal (34). 
In the Seattle case, the courts upheld the board rule 
which prohibited membership in the American Federation of Labor 
or its locals. All prospective teachers were required to sign 
a declaration of nonmembership (13). 
The Federal Congress passed the National Labor Relations 
Act in 1935. Although this act did not extend the right to 
union membership to public employees, school boards began to 
exhibit a more lenient attitude toward membership in teachers' 
organizations of all kinds (34). 
The right of teachers to union membership was later upheld 
in a Connecticut court decision of 1951 (4) (Norwalk Teachers' 
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Assn. V. Board of Education/ 138 Conn. 269, 83 A(2d) 482). The 
Norwalk case said that teachers do have the right to union 
affiliation. 
While teachers have gained the right to union membership, 
the courts have consistently upheld teachers' rights to non-
membership. The concept of a "union shop" enforced by boards 
of education has been expressly prohibited in several court 
rulings—most notably in Montana in 1959 (12) (Benson v. School 
District No. 1 of Silver Bow County, 136 Montana 77, 344 P. 2d 
117). In this case, three important legal principles were 
established relative to union nonmembership: 
1. A board of education lacks authority to 
require union membership on the part of 
school teachers as a condition to receiving 
an increased salary. 
2. A board of education has no power to 
discriminate between teachers employed by 
it as to amount of salary to be paid them 
on the basis of their membership in a 
labor union. 
3. An agreement by a board of education to 
hire only union members would clearly be 
an illegal discrimination (12, p. 135). 
In addition to the above decision, several states have 
adopted statutes outlawing clauses in teachers' contracts 
requiring membership in any specific organization as a condi­
tion of employment (34). 
Collective Bargaining 
The National Labor Relations Act of 1935 specifically 
excludes public employees from the collective bargaining 
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process. Even so, the Act does provide a framework or model 
through which bargaining by teachers' groups may be instituted 
with the school board (34). 
The landmark case (4) in Connecticut in 1951 established 
the following legal principles : 
1. Collective bargaining or professional 
negotiation is legally permissible between 
a board of education and an organization of 
its employees, if the strike threat is absent. 
2. An organization of employees and a board of 
education may not negotiate a contract which 
involves the surrender of the board's legal 
discretion, is contrary to law, or is other­
wise ultra vires. 
In 1959, Wisconsin enacted the first legislation for 
teacher-board bargaining. Between 1960 and 1970 nearly forty 
per cent of the state legislatures enacted collective bargain­
ing statutes for their teachers (28). The increased number of 
states enacting teacher collective bargaining statutes 
received heightened impetus from Executive Orders 10988 (14) 
and 11491 (15). These Executive Orders established the formal 
framework for effective bargaining for federal employees. In 
the area of education, these orders include teachers employed 
by the defense department overseas dependent schools. 
Executive Order 10988 (14) was signed by President John F. 
Kennedy, January 17, 1962. This order gave federal employees 
the right to organize and to consult with employing agencies 
concerning the formulation and implementation of policies and 
practices affecting employee working conditions. 
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This order also provided for the formal, informal, and 
exclusive recognition of the bargaining unit while excluding 
managerial personnel from the bargaining unit. Although 
Executive Order 10988 (14) authorized impasse arbitration, 
findings were not binding. No mention of salary negotiation 
was made; and, although the strike was not specifically out­
lawed, no agent which authorized the use of the strike could 
be recognized. 
Executive Order 10988 (14) was superseded effective July 
1, 1970, by Executive Order 11491 (15) which was signed by 
President Richard M. Nixon on October 29, 1969. Negotiable 
areas and personnel covered by the two orders are essentially 
the same. 
Executive Order 11941 (15), however, created three new 
federal regulatory agencies to deal with labor relations 
problems. These are the Federal Relations Council, which is 
charged with administration of the Order; the Federal Service 
Impasse Panel, which may negotiate impasses; and an Assistant 
Secretary of Labor-Management Relations, who handles unit 
representation disputes. 
While Executive Order 11491 (15) does make provisions for 
grievance arbitration; like Order 10988 (14), recommendations 
by mediators or arbitrators for impasse resolution are not 
binding. 
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The primary difference between the executive orders 
described above and the state statutes reviewed is that under 
most state laws salaries and other economic issues are nego­
tiable, whereas they are not under the federal executive 
orders. 
Education U.S.A. (16) reported that by November, 1976, a 
total of thirty-four state legislatures had enacted public 
employee collective bargaining statutes. These teacher col­
lective bargaining statutes which have been enacted at the 
state level vary widely in scope and detail. They can be 
classified in two ways: (1) permissive or mandatory and 
(2) conference or bargaining. These classifications of 
legislation relative to teacher collective bargaining are 
defined as follows : 
Permissive legislation - grants teachers and boards the 
right to confer or bargain at the option of one or the 
other. 
Mandatory legislation - requires teacher-board bargaining. 
Conference legislation - gives official sanctions to 
teacher-board dialogue but imposes few obligations on 
either party. 
Bargaining legislation - introduces new concepts and 
imposes new obligations into already established teacher-
board relations (21). 
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The statutes which have been enacted thus far by the 
states' legislatures vary in their definition of such basic 
elements as the scope of negotiations, unit representation, 
procedural matters, appellate procedure, and other issues 
related to the settlement of disputes. 
Palmer (36) analyzed twenty-eight state statutes and one 
territorial statute using the following seven criteria: 
1. Who is included under the statute 
2. Selection and recognition of the bargaining unit 
3. Type of negotiation specified (i.e. meet and confer, 
etc. ) 
4. Negotiation procedures, if any 
5. Limitations on areas of negotiation 
6. Impasse procedures 
7. Strikes 
Palmer (36) concluded that, of the twenty-nine statutes 
he reviewed, a composite statute would include the following 
features based on the seven criteria; 
1. It would include only teachers and some or all 
administrators. 
2. Selection of the bargaining unit would be by 
voluntary employer recognition of majority status 
except in case of dispute when an election would 
determine the bargaining unit. Recognition would be 
exclusive. 
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3. Good faith negotiation would be required of employers 
and employees. 
4. No negotiation procedures would be specified. 
5. Negotiations would be limited to wages, hours and 
other conditions of employment. 
6. Nonbinding mediation and/or fact-finding and/or 
arbitration would be required in case of impasse. 
7. The strike would be declared illegal. 
Even without state statutes, the courts have been con­
sistently involved in the issues of teacher collective 
bargaining. The court's rationale for treating teacher-board 
bargaining issues was illustrated in the Norwalk teachers' 
case cited earlier. A more recent case (Chicago Division 
Illinois Education Association v. Board of Education (1966) 76 
Illinois Appellate 2d 456) upheld the Chicago board's agree­
ment to bargain with the Chicago teachers' union despite the 
absence of enabling legislation. The overriding opinion in 
that case was as follows: 
Conflicts in teacher-board relations are 
inherent in the employment relationship and 
must be resolved in an orderly, efficient 
manner (21, p. 214). 
It is apparent that collective bargaining between teachers 
and boards of education has now been firmly established and 
state legislatures will continue to enact legislation to this 
effect. The traditional paternalistic employer-employee model 
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of the past no longer is acceptable to a substantial number of 
teachers. 
In addition to state legislatures enacting teacher collec­
tive bargaining statutes, the United States Congress has shown 
interest in enacting a federal bargaining law which would grant 
collective bargaining rights to teachers and other public 
employees throughout the country. In 1975, committees in both 
the House and Senate of the 94th Congress considered two such 
alternative bills (2). Both of these bills contained the 
following provisions; (1) provided federal power to force 
school boards across the country into collective bargaining; 
(2) established the federal government as the final arbitrator 
in labor disputes between teachers and school boards; (3) pro­
vided that boards of education must bargain matters of educa­
tional policy with their employees; and (4) sanctioned strikes 
under a number of circumstances (1). 
One of the bills, supported by the A.F.L.-C.I.O. and the 
American Federation of Teachers, would have placed public 
employee bargaining units under the jurisdiction of the 
National Labor Relations Board which, since 1934, has regulated 
only private-sector bargaining practices. The other bill, 
supported by the National Education Association, would have 
given public employees essentially the same collective bargain­
ing rights as the first bill, but would have created a separate 
and parallel board outside the National Labor Relations Board 
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to regulate public-sector bargaining (2). 
Because of strong demands from the A.F.L.-C.I.O. and labor 
organizations which represented public employees, including the 
American Federation of Teachers and the National Education 
Association, it appeared likely that the heavily Democratic and 
pro-labor 94th Congress would pass one or the other of the 
bills previously described. 
According to Steinhilber (51), however, the enactment of 
a federal collective bargaining law for public employees, 
including teachers, became somewhat doubtful during the summer 
of 1976, when the United States Supreme Court ruled in the 
National League of Cities v. Usery case that the extension of 
the Federal Fair Labor Standards Act to state and local public 
employees is unconstitutional. The Court said, according to 
Steinhilber (51), that the state as a "public employer" must 
retain its responsibility to perform governmental functions 
that entail the determination of wages, hours, and over-time 
provisions. 
National Education Association President John Ryor said 
following the Court decision: 
" . . .  t h i s  d e c i s i o n  .  .  .  s t r i k e s  a t  t h e  v e r y  
core of the power of Congress to act on a 
federal collective bargaining bill for state 
and local government employees, including 
teachers and faculties" (42, p. 40). 
Regardless of whether a federal collective bargaining law 
for public employees is enacted or not, it appears that teacher 
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collective bargaining is spreading throughout the nation with­
out the aid of such a law. According to a National School 
Boards Association member survey conducted in 1976 (17), two-
thirds of the nation's school boards currently engage in 
collective bargaining with teacher unions. The pattern, how­
ever, varies by region. Outside the South, eighty per cent of 
the school boards bargain with teachers, most commonly in the 
East and in urban and suburban school districts. In the South 
only one in ten school boards is involved in teacher collective 
bargaining. Certainly, teacher collective bargaining appears 
to be a national movement that is here to stay. 
Teacher Strikes 
A strike is the cessation of work by a group of employees 
for the purpose of coercing an employer to accede to some 
demand which the employees have made upon him and which he has 
refused (21). 
The history of the American labor movement is consistently 
filled with numerous and oftentimes successfully carried out 
employee strikes. The strike seems to be a natural outgrowth 
of a collective bargaining process which has not brought about 
an employee-eitç>loyer agreement. 
While most states having statutes establishing teacher 
collective bargaining expressly prohibit the use of strikes, 
six states (Alaska, California, Idaho, Minnesota, Rhode Island, 
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Vermont, and Washington) make no mention of strikes in their 
statutes (28). 
Johnson (28) reported in a survey of forty-nine chief 
state school officers that two states, Michigan and Pennsylva­
nia, authorize strikes of public employees after collective 
bargaining procedures, including mediation or arbitration, have 
failed to produce an agreement. In each case a series of steps 
is to be followed, including serving notice to the other party. 
It appears, however, that regardless of the manner in 
which a state has implemented teacher negotiations statutes, 
states with bargaining laws have had more strikes than those 
without. Education U.S.A. (16) reported that since 1958, 
states with teacher bargaining laws have had more strikes than 
those without except in 1961, and the number of teacher strikes 
continues to rise. This report also shows from 1964-1974 the 
average number of strikes for public employees covered by 
bargaining laws was at least double that for those not covered. 
Pennsylvania, for example, averaged six strikes per year before 
its bargaining law was passed in 1970, and seventy-three 
strikes per year since then. 
Currently, according to the report in Education U.S.A. 
(16), thirty-four states have legislation setting down guide­
lines for authorized collective bargaining for public employees. 
Others will be acting in the near future. It will be inter­
esting to watch how each handles legislation concerning strikes 
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by public employees. It will also be interesting to see if a 
result of teacher collective bargaining in Iowa will be an 
increase in teacher strikes among Iowa's teachers. 
Teacher Collective Bargaining Studies Before the 
Enactment of the Iowa Public Employment 
Relations Act 
Before the enactment of the Iowa Public Employment Rela­
tions Act, studies were done at Iowa State University relative 
to teacher collective bargaining in Iowa by Kenneth F. Palmer 
(36), Marvin O'Hare (35), Henry Borger (6), and LeRoy Eugene 
Johnson (28). 
Palmer (36) found significant differences of opinion 
between superintendents and teacher association presidents 
regarding the need for a collective bargaining statute, who 
should be included under the law, the negotiable areas to be 
included in the statute, and the legality of teacher strikes. 
O'Hare (35) attempted to delineate the status of the 
collective negotiation phenomenon as perceived by Iowa teachers 
and superintendents. While O'Hare found several points of 
agreement between teachers and superintendents relative to the 
scope and content of a teacher collective bargaining law, his 
findings clearly delineated several major points of disagree­
ment between teachers and superintendents in Iowa relative to 
enactment of a teacher collective bargaining statute. Notable 
among the findings in O'Hare's (35) study were: 
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1. elementary and secondary teachers viewed the 
negotiation phenomenon similarly. 
2. respondents from the larger schools tended to 
express the same attitude toward negotiations 
as did their counterparts from smaller schools. 
3. there was a high degree of job satisfaction 
among Iowa teachers and superintendents. 
Berger (6) attempted to determine the status and content 
of collective negotiations and the roles of board members and 
superintendents in collective negotiations as perceived by 
Iowa board members and superintendents. Notable among the 
findings in Borger's (6) study were: 
1. both board members and superintendents perceived 
negotiation procedure items and salary policy items 
as negotiable. 
2. board members were more certain than superintendents 
of their role and the role of the superintendent in 
collective negotiations. 
3. board members were significantly more receptive to 
the negotiability of issues which pertain to class­
room instruction (e.g., curriculum review, develop­
ment of special education programs, student 
evaluation, teacher evaluation, and pupil progress 
reports and promotion policies). 
Johnson (28), in another pre-Iowa Public Employment 
Relations Act study, found that Iowa teachers, elementary 
principals, secondary principals, superintendents, and board 
members agreed that: 
1. a collective negotiations statute should not allow 
local school boards to close school as a means to 
settlement of a dispute. 
2. procedures to be followed during the discussions 
should be agreed upon by the parties involved in the 
negotiations process, prior to actual negotiations. 
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3. the negotiating unit for the teachers should be 
selected by an unbiased election in which each 
teacher employed is entitled to vote for the unit 
of his choice. 
4. the negotiating unit elected should be the exclusive 
negotiating unit for all the teachers. 
5. expenses incurred by the teachers' negotiating unit 
should be borne by all of the teachers represented. 
6. it is neither favorable nor disfavorable for the 
principal to assume a position of neutrality during 
collective negotiations proceedings between the board 
and teachers. 
7. attempts toward solution of a complaint should be 
made through normal administrative channels before 
the complaint is considered a grievance. 
8. the principal should be the first step in the 
grievance procedure, unless he is a subject of the 
grievance. 
The data concerning teacher collective bargaining in Iowa 
which was obtained through research done prior to the enactment 
of the Iowa Public Employment Act provides many insights into 
the rationale for many aspects of the collective bargaining 
statute which was finally enacted. This data also provides 
some insight into the expected outcomes such a statute will 
produce. 
The Iowa Law 
The sixty-fifth General Assembly of the State of Iowa 
passed the first comprehensive labor relations legislation for 
Iowa public sector employers and employees on April 4, 1974. 
Governor Robert D. Ray signed the bill into law on April 23, 
1974. This law is called the Iowa Public Employment Relations 
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Act. The law became effective July 1, 1974, except that the 
provisions relating to the duty to bargain took effect July 1, 
1975, and certain provisions regarding state employees became 
effective July 1, 1976. 
The Iowa Public Employment Relations Act (54) is very 
specific in establishing the structure and provisions of the 
collective bargaining process for Iowa's public employees. 
Provisions include the structure for the administration of the 
Act, public employer rights/ public employee rights, unit 
representation, the scope of negotiations, procedural matters, 
impasse procedures, and the no-strike clause. 
The Iowa Public Employment Relations Act (54) is definite 
and restrictive in outlining the scope of negotiable subjects. 
Section 20.9 (54) states that public employers and employees 
shall ". . . negotiate in good faith with respect to wages, 
hours, vacations, insurance, holidays, leaves of absence, shift 
differentials, overtime compensation, supplemental pay, 
seniority, transfer procedures, job classifications, health and 
safety matters, evaluation procedures, procedures for staff 
reduction, in-service training and other matters mutually 
agreed upon." Employers must also negotiate an employee 
grievance procedure and a method of payroll deduction for 
association dues. 
Definitely excluded from negotiations are the authority 
and power of the merit employment department. Board of Regents' 
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merit system, educational radio and television facility board's 
merit system, and the public employee retirement systems 
including IPERS. 
The most intriguing discussions in the bargaining process 
will be in relation to "and other matters mutually agreed 
upon." Such nonmandatory subjects of bargaining under the law 
(54), such as class size, curriculum, supplemental duties, 
parent-teacher conferences, teaching materials, staff meetings, 
disruptive students, organizational structure of the school, 
determination of educational specifications for new buildings, 
the use of teacher aides, and many other subjects, will 
certainly be introduced at the bargaining table. Only time 
will tell what nonmandatory "other matters mutually agreed 
upon" will actually become a part of the teacher collective 
bargaining process and to what extent their inclusion in the 
collective bargaining process will affect public education in 
Iowa. 
The Iowa Public Employment Relations Act (54) provides a 
definite outline of "procedures" to be followed during the 
bargaining process and stipulates that a negotiated agreement 
must be reached between the employer and employee organization 
no later than one-hundred-twenty days prior to the certified 
budget submission date of the public employer. 
The Act (54) provides a definite set of impasse procedures 
to be followed if an agreement is not reached by the specified 
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deadline. These impasse procedures begin at the "mediation" 
level and may continue through fact-finding and arbitration. 
The Iowa Public Employment Relations Act (54) is binding in 
that the arbitrators' decisions are final and must be adhered 
to by the public employer and the public employee organization. 
The Iowa Public Employment Relations Act (54) expressly 
prohibits strikes by public employees. Section 20.12 (54) of 
the act makes instigation, encouragement, ratification or 
participation in a strike by public employees or an employee 
organization unlawful. Only time will tell whether the 
combination of binding arbitration and the np-strike clause 
will, in fact, prevent strikes. 
Expected Outcomes 
A thorough examination of the literature indicated a very 
sparse number of research studies or opinions concerning the 
expected outcomes of teachers, superintendents, and board 
members relative to teacher collective bargaining. 
Several studies have been completed to determine teacher 
attitudes toward the bargaining process. An examination of 
these studies will, perhaps, provide insight into expected out­
comes in this area. 
In a study conducted in 1975, Hennessy (23) sought to 
ascertain the extent to which Ontario, Quebec and New York 
teachers were prepared to adopt militant bargaining strategies 
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and identify factors which may contribute to the development 
of militant attitudes. The study broadly defined militancy 
among teachers as "aggressive behavior and conflict-oriented 
strategies in (teachers') collective contracts with the centers 
of power and authority in education." The results of the study 
were that the teachers who responded to the questionnaire 
preferred nonmilitant methods of negotiations with a high 
preference stated for use of a professional mediator and an 
opportunity for presentation of views to the board by teachers. 
Restriction of teacher services (work-to-the-rule) and the 
strike showed strong nonpreference. The results of the study 
further showed that the perceived needs of teachers focus on 
their professional autonomy and the recognition they receive 
as individual persons. The dominant theme in comments on the 
questionnaire was the teachers' sense of isolation; that board 
members and administrators do not understand the daily demand 
on their teachers, that the public doesn't really care about 
them as educators, and that the lines of communication must be 
repaired. 
The Hennessy study (23) also provides some insight into 
expected instructional outcomes. It was concluded from the 
study that teacher self-fulfillment is the key to the new 
professionalism that is emerging and that teachers appear to 
be ready to be independent persons accountable for the effects 
they have on children. 
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In a California study, Richard Porter (39) attempted to 
identify those attitudes which best serve to explain the 
concept of teacher militancy, and to provide a basis for 
development of concise instruments for the assessment of such 
attitudes. A survey instrument, entitled "Classroom Teacher 
Point of View," was constructed to assess attitudes of teachers 
regarding their work environments and regarding issues commonly 
associated with teacher militancy, union organization, and 
professionalism. The self-administering survey instruments 
were returned by 2,178 classroom teachers in elementary and 
secondary schools in the 1,389 California unified school 
districts which had an average daily attendance greater than 
4,000. Results of the survey provided a basis for defining 
teacher militancy as a complex of attitudes characteristically 
including a pronounced lack of confidence in school district 
administration, a general lack of support for the school 
principal, a cynical disbelief in the integrity of those in 
authority, a dissatisfaction with existing conditions of educa­
tion, a strong predisposition toward educational change in 
general, a marked tendency to accept the processes of union 
organization, and an inclination to seek increased professional 
authority and responsibility. The respondents in the Porter 
(39) study felt that obtaining a beneficial collective bargain­
ing contract is beneficial even if teachers have to go on 
strike to secure it. They further believed that the only way 
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teachers will ever become recognized as respectable profes­
sionals is by using the collective bargaining process to secure 
this recognition. 
In a study conducted in ten school districts in Southern 
California, Smith and Fox (48) sought to determine the atti­
tudes of teachers toward the negotiation procedures presently 
employed, and they developed an instrument to predict the level 
of support and desired involvement of teachers in negotiation 
procedures. Attitudinal data toward suggested items for 
negotiation were collected under four headings: (1) attitude 
of teachers toward the negotiation process, (2) evaluation by 
teachers of the negotiation process, (3) teachers' perception 
of the effectiveness of the negotiation process, and 
(4) subjects which should (or should not) be included in the 
negotiating process. The questionnaire contained seventy-two 
items—eighteen in each of the above four categories. Each 
item could be answered "Strongly Agree," "Agree," "Undecided," 
"Disagree," or "Strongly Disagree." Results of the investiga­
tion implied that teachers distinguish between two general 
negotiation areas: (1) professional duties, and (2) working 
conditions. Smith and Fox (48) concluded that teachers are 
most concerned that they be involved in determining items to 
be negotiated in the area of professional duties and demonstrate 
a willingness to assume a more passive role in the area of 
working conditions. 
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Kirst (29) found that teacher organizations are primarily 
concerned with issues of salary, promotions, and working 
conditions. Carlton and Goodwin (8) maintain that teachers 
are demanding a broad scope of negotiable items with a main 
thrust being a demand for equal power in formulating educa­
tional policies. 
Vaughn (61) reported that in Chicago teachers are seeking 
a greater role in curriculum decision-making through collective 
bargaining. She maintains that it is only reasonable for 
teachers' unions to demand a greater role in developing the 
goals and objectives that teachers are being held responsible 
for implementing. Vaughn (61, p. 91) further stated: 
With the advent of collective bargaining 
for teachers, the position once maintained by 
boards of education — that curriculum matters 
were outside the scope of collective bargaining— 
has been modified .... Through the collective 
voice of one teacher organization, designated by 
its members as the sole collective bargaining 
agent, relevent goals can be developed and 
changes in curriculum.and programs.negotiated. 
The result, in my opinion, will enhance the 
educational process and lead to the ultimate 
goal of quality education for all children. 
Further indication of teacher interest in expanding 
collective bargaining to include decisions relative to curricu­
lum and instruction comes from Lee Hansen when he says : 
As teacher unions have matured, they have 
come to realize that instructional decisions 
and "working condition" decisions cannot be 
clearly distinguished. Any decision that impacts 
on a teacher in any way is seemingly fair game 
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for the negotiating or grievance processes. 
With this attitude, teachers have done much 
to wrest control for instructional decision 
making from the administration (20, p. 91). 
In a study by Krey, Netzer and Eye (31, p. 470) curric­
ulum supervisors in Wisconsin were surveyed to determine the 
effects of master contracts of teachers on the supervision of 
instruction. Several conclusions from this study follow: 
1. Master contracts of teachers generally do not 
prohibit supervisors from nor create much 
interference for supervisors in fulfilling their 
responsibilities. 
2. Supervision is perceived to be a phase of 
management by those negotiating master contracts. 
3. Current master contracts of teachers are no 
great threat to curriculum supervisors. 
4. System-wide curricular guides, plans, or documents 
still prevail as an approach to curriculum 
development. 
Even though Krey, Netzer and Eye (31, p. 470) saw no 
immediate effect of master contracts of teachers on the super­
vision of instruction, a concluding statement to their study 
indicated expected outcomes of teacher collective bargaining 
relative to the supervision of instruction; 
It is recommended that supervisors be 
increasingly alert to additional intrusion on 
their function by negotiated agreements in 
master contracts. It is also recommended that 
curriculum supervisors develop their skills in 
adapting to provisions of master contracts of 
teachers. Those persons creating the master 
contracts need to be more fully aware of the 
impact of negotiated agreements on instructional 
program as well as on individuals employed in the 
school system. 
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A number of interesting findings relative to the actual 
outcomes of teacher collective bargaining were reported in a 
study by Booth and Carlson (5). Booth and Carlson (5) con­
ducted their study in Illinois, a state which does not have a 
mandatory teacher collective bargaining law. Illinois law 
does permit teacher collective bargaining. Therefore, approxi­
mately one-half of the school districts in Illinois do have 
formal bargaining agreements with their teachers and do have 
written master contracts. Because of the large number of 
school districts both with and without formal bargaining 
agreements. Booth and Carlson were able to compare teacher 
benefits derived from bargaining verses nonbargaining districts. 
Following are major findings from the study (5): 
1. There were no significant salary or fringe 
benefit differences between bargaining and 
nonbargaining districts. 
2. Bargaining districts use legal and professional 
assistance in bargaining to a greater extent 
than nonbargaining districts. 
3. The presence of a master contract increased 
teacher involvement in adopting a student dress 
code and replacing a head coach. 
4. The presence of a master contract decreased 
teacher involvement in establishing a citizens 
advisory committee, adding a learning disabilities 
teacher, assigning curriculum committees, assigning 
summer school positions, adopting new textbooks, 
purchasing supplies or library books, agree to 
use of student teachers, and arranging in-service 
programs. 
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Few studies have been conducted concerning superintendents' 
attitudes toward any expected outcomes of teacher militancy as 
it relates to teacher collective bargaining. One such study, 
conducted in 1970 by John Stuckey (52) , was done among super­
intendents in Oregon. These superintendents represented a non-
probability sample of fifteen superintendents selected from 
forty-eight superintendents who had identified themselves as 
most disturbed and concerned about teacher militancy on a 
mailed Feelings Inventory. Each of the fifteen superintendents 
was interviewed to provide more information about his feelings 
and views. 
Analysis of the interview responses to questions dealing 
with administrative authority revealed that ninety-three per 
cent of the superintendents viewed teacher militancy to be 
threatening the authority and influence of superintendents. 
The role of the superintendent was seen by ninety-three per 
cent of the sample population to be changing because of teacher 
militancy. Administrative authority, labor-management tactics, 
teacher relationships, and types of leadership styles were 
identified as changing and affecting the role of the superin­
tendent. Stuckey (52) found that most superintendents (87%) 
in his study were upset because they viewed their actual role 
in teacher collective bargaining as inconsistent with their 
preferred role. The superintendents were also upset because 
they saw teacher organizations, such as the American Federation 
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of Teachers and the National Education Association, as straying 
from the profession. 
Changes resulting from teacher militancy were viewed by 
eighty-seven per cent of the superintendents in the Stuckey 
study (52) as increasing their work load and problems. Every 
superintendent interviewed predicted that teacher militancy 
would have an impact on education. This impact was seen as 
involving local control, teacher unions, professionalism, and 
public support of education. The superintendents were pessi­
mistic about this impact and indicated harmful consequences 
could result. Perhaps the following comments by one of the 
superintendents best summarized the feelings of the superin­
tendents in the Stuckey (52, p. 26) study: 
The thing that most disturbs me is that 
there is the school board, school superintendent, 
and taxpayers on the one hand, and the teachers 
on the other hand who say 'we are going to have 
these things right now.' This is the greatest 
problem I've seen. Teachers want to change 
things immediately—without any concern for 
anybody else, including children. 
It is not clear from the above studies what the actual 
outcomes, relative to superintendents, will be as a result of 
teacher collective bargaining. One thing is apparent, however, 
and that is that superintendents do expect their traditional 
roles to change as a result of teacher collective bargaining. 
Taylor (53, p. 17) stated: 
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When boards of education yield to the 
teachers' demands and adopt negotiating procedures, 
the traditional board-administrator-teacher 
relationship becomes ill-adopted. 
Rhodes (40, p. 112) felt that the superintendent could 
best serve in the capacity of advisor to both parties—the 
board of education and the teachers' organization. In 
expressing his view he said: 
I mean that he should not be the school 
board's representative in the bargaining sessions 
with teachers. He can be a consultant or advisor 
to the board and he can work closely . . . with 
the teachers. But a superintendent gets into too 
many difficulties in direct bargaining. He 
simply isn't in a position to be a tough labor 
boss one night and show up at his office the next 
morning as the instructional leader (40, p. 112). 
Ball (3, p. 70) suggested a major outcome, as far as 
superintendents are concerned, of teacher collective bargaining 
when he said: 
To be successful in this new activity, the 
superintendent must change his mind on one item 
that has often obsessed him in the past, and 
that is that 'everything goes through me.' The 
old idea of the superintendent as a person who 
possesses all wisdom and has to keep his fingers 
on every detail of every phase of the operation 
simply will not work in the field of bargaining. 
Here, in a sense, the superintendent is no 
longer central. The focal groups involved are 
the teachers on one hand and the public, on the 
other. When the chips are down, there will only 
be these two groups involved in the bargaining 
and it is they who will make the final decision. 
While there were no studies concerning board members' 
expected outcomes apparent in the literature, there were some 
opinions. Heddinger (22) expressed a view reportedly held by 
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many board members when he said that school officials have no 
right to allow collective bargaining to constrain or impinge 
upon the educational opportunities to be provided to children. 
Heddinger (22) also observed that many board members do not 
feel that bargaining agents who represent teachers represent 
children or the general public. Wyatt (62, p. 101) contended 
that, . . the board of the future will be divested of its 
traditional authority, autonomy, and paternalism." 
Perry and Wildman (38, p. 216) conceptualized the most 
basic outcome of teacher collective bargaining where school 
boards are concerned when they stated: 
In the absence of a collective bargaining 
relationship, policy formulation and implementa­
tion in a local school district is a de facto 
legislative process. Although a board of 
education enjoys a legal right to make final 
decisions on policy, this right is qualified by 
the political need to consider and accommodate, 
to some extent, the views of various constituent 
groups. Thus, in practice, decision making by a 
board can be viewed as a process in which a 
board of education serves to mediate possibly 
conflicting interests among the following types 
of groups: (1) taxpayers; (2) parents; (3) civil 
rights organizations; (4) school administrators; 
(5) classroom teachers; and (6) board members 
themselves. 
Collective bargaining is essentially a 
bilateral decision-making process. It requires 
that a board of education achieve a concensus 
among all interest groups but teachers and then 
defend that consensus against a consensus among 
teachers as developed and articulated by a teacher 
organization. As a result, a board of education 
and school management engaged in bargaining must 
often abandon its neutral role of mediator and 
assume an active role as adversary to teachers. 
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Clement (9) felt that one of the outcomes of teacher 
collective bargaining would be that many of the best people 
will no longer seek positions on boards of education and that 
their places will be taken by politicians who are adept at 
bargaining but have little concept of what good education is 
and what is best for schools and children. 
In a search for further information relative to the long-
range instructional and noninstructional outcomes of teacher 
collective bargaining, the researcher was unable to find a 
great deal more empirical information. School board associa­
tion representatives in several states with long histories of 
teacher collective bargaining were contacted. Information 
from George Tipler (59), Wisconsin Association of School Boards, 
Inc., indicated that school board turnover is approximately 
twice as fast as it was before the implementation of a manda­
tory bargaining law in 1972. Tipler (59) also indicated that 
the relationship between teachers, superintendents and board 
members has become more adversarial since 1972, and that the 
public has taken a more negative view of teachers since the 
implementation of teacher collective bargaining. Information 
from the New Jersey School Boards Association revealed that 
teachers have obtained higher salaries and fringe benefits via 
the negotiations process. 
Anthony Pascal and Lorraine McDonnell (37) of The Rand 
Corporation's Policy Research Center in Educational Finance and 
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Governance have recently contracted with the Office of the 
Assistant Secretary for Education, Department of Health, 
Education and Welfare, to do a five year longitudinal study on 
the effects of teacher collective bargaining. Included in 
this study will be an attempt to determine the long-range 
effects of teacher collective bargaining on class size pro­
visions, teacher evaluation, professional growth and in-service, 
use of aides and specialists, and teacher participation in 
textbook selection and curriculum review. 
In summary, the literature seemed to indicate that boards 
of education and administrators in general feel that teacher 
collective bargaining will be detrimental to the educational 
process. Kowalczyk (30) perhaps best summed up the feelings 
of boards of education and superintendents when he said that 
collective bargaining leads to a relationship between board 
and association in which the association is challenging the 
board's assumed autonomy—its exclusive right to determine all 
instructional policies. This leads to an adversarial relation­
ship. Teachers and teacher associations on the other hand 
feel that adversary relationships can be productive and whole­
some. 
According to Hemdon (24) , one point seems certain con­
cerning the expected outcomes of collective bargaining by 
teachers : disputes between teachers and school boards are 
going to shift from wages and working conditions to control of 
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educational policy. Both national teacher associations, the 
American Federation of Teachers and the National Education 
Association, agree on this key point for the future. 
Conclusions 
The current slogan of teacher organizations across 
America might well coincide with that of an equally timely 
slogan for a women's cigarette commercial, "You've come a long 
way. Baby." In just shortly over fifty years the public 
employees collective bargaining movement has progressed from 
the actual outlawing of union membership to full collective 
bargaining, binding arbitration, and in some cases, legalized 
public employee (including teachers) strikes. 
Certainly, as other states enact collective bargaining 
statutes, even more deliberate steps will be taken to insure 
teachers and other employees the same rights in securing 
increased wages and improved working conditions as those 
enjoyed by employees in the private sector of our economy. It 
seems apparent from the review of literature that many state 
legislatures have made an effort over the past few years to 
insure teachers of the right to bargain collectively. In 
states where teacher collective bargaining has been in 
existence for several years, it appears that only recently has 
anyone attempted to determine the long-range instructional and 
noninstructional outcomes. 
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It is apparent that people associated with public educa­
tion in Iowa are experiencing the dawning of a new era in the 
public employee-employer relationship. The boys and girls of 
Iowa will certainly be the beneficiaries if the principal 
parties in the teacher collective bargaining process can 
examine their long-range expected outcomes now rather than 
after the fact, as has happened in other states. 
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CHAPTER III. METHODS AND PROCEDURES 
The major purpose of this investigation was to gather 
data so as to determine if there were significant differences 
in the expected instructional and noninstructional outcomes of 
the Iowa Public Employment Relations Act between and among 
groups of randomly selected Iowa teachers, superintendents, 
and board members. These data were gathered by the administra­
tion of a survey via the U.S. mail to randomly selected Iowa 
elementary teachers, secondary teachers, superintendents, and 
board members. 
The Development of the Questionnaire 
A part of the survey called for the following specific 
information: sex, number of years in teaching, and whether 
the financial remuneration received from teaching is a primary 
or secondary source of family income from the teacher respond­
ents ; years of experience as a superintendent from the super­
intendent respondents; and whether the school district of 
which the respondent is a part has a formal teacher bargaining 
unit. 
The bulk of the survey, however, called for responses on 
a five point Likert scale to a number of "expected outcome" 
statements. Through the review of literature and assistance 
from an Iowa State University graduate class in Administration 
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of School Personnel, the list of seventy-five "expected out­
come" statements was developed. The respondents were asked to 
react to each expected outcome statement with "strongly agree," 
"agree," "neutral," "disagree," or "strongly disagree." 
The first draft of the questionnaire was submitted to the 
following persons for review and suggestions: 
Ross Engel: Professor of Education Administration 
Iowa State University, Ames, Iowa 
William Halverson: Superintendent of Schools 
Newton Community Schools, Newton, Iowa 
William Freese; Chief Negotiator for Board 
Newton Community Schools, Newton, Iowa 
Doug Meinhart: Chief Negotiator for the Newton Education 
Association 
Newton Community Schools, Newton, Iowa 
Their suggestions were incorporated into a refined form 
of the questionnaire used in the pilot study. 
The Pilot Study 
A pilot test of the instrument and statistical analysis 
was conducted through the cooperation of Dr. Anton Netusil of 
Iowa State University; and twenty-five elementary teachers, 
twenty-five secondary teachers, five superintendents and ten 
board members selected from five school districts from which 
teachers, superintendents, and board members were not to be 
selected for the final administration of the questionnaire. 
After the pilot questionnaires were returned, suggestions 
provided by the respondents were incorporated into a revised 
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form of the questionnaire to improve content and clarity. 
The investigator applied the statistical analysis 
described later in this chapter to the pilot data to determine 
the appropriateness of the selected analyses. 
Selection of the Sample 
Selection of the study sample of teachers, superintendents, 
and board members was made from the population of teachers, 
superintendents, and board members of Iowa's twenty—five 
largest and twenty-five smallest school districts. A sample of 
twenty-five board members, twenty-five superintendents and 300 
teachers were systematically selected using an alphabetized 
list of board members, superintendents, and teachers from each 
of the two groups of twenty-five school districts to select 
every nth name on the lists. It was believed that the size of 
that sample would yield sufficient numbers of persons with 
each of the demographic characteristics to be analyzed so as to 
provide an accurate representation of the population. 
Collection of the Data 
A total of 700 questionnaires were mailed to the selected 
sample of teachers, superintendents, and board members in 
Iowa's twenty-five largest and twenty-five smallest school 
districts. Following a two week period for the initial mailing 
to have been completed and returned, a follow-up letter with 
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another copy of the questionnaire was mailed to those persons 
who had not yet responded. Two weeks after the second mailing, 
post card reminders were sent to those persons who had still 
not responded. Since a total of sixty-nine percent of those 
who were initially selected for the study sample had responded 
following the third mailing, no further follow-up was done. 
Treatment of the Data 
The data collected through the questionnaire was cate­
gorized into cells according to size of district and the 
respondents' school roles. Additional categorization of the 
data was made according to the following demographic character­
istics of the respondents: teacher sex, whether the financial 
remuneration the teachers receive from teaching is a primary 
or secondary source of family income, years of experience in 
present job role for superintendents and teachers, and whether 
the school district had a formal teacher bargaining unit at 
the time of the administration of the survey. 
The seventy-five "expected outcome" statements were 
categorized into ten scales as shown in Appendix C. The ten 
scales are: (1) Teacher-Superintendent/Board Relations, 
(2) Board Power, (3) Job Satisfaction, (4) Salaries-Fringes, 
(5) Instructional Implications, (6) Teacher Input, (7) Public 
Opinion, (8) Working Conditions, (9) Budget, and (10) Political 
Involvement. Pearson Correlation coefficients were computed 
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for each "expected outcome" statement to determine that item's 
correlation to its assigned scale and to every other scale. 
All items correlated to their assigned scale at the .001 
significance level. 
Using the aforementioned scales, the data was then 
analyzed using the following parametric statistical treatments. 
Mean scores were computed for each of the comparison groups on 
each of the scales by assigning a value of 1 to the "strongly 
agree" response, a value of 2 to the "agree" response, a value 
of 3 to the "neutral" response, a value of 4 to the "disagree" 
response, and a value of 5 to the "strongly disagree" response. 
An analysis of variance was then conducted and the F-ratio was 
used to test the following hypotheses: 
1. There are no differences in the expected instructional 
and noninstructional outcomes of the Iowa Public 
Employment Relations Act between the groups of Iowa 
elementary teachers, secondary teachers, superin­
tendents, and board members. 
2. There are no differences in the expected instructional 
and noninstructional outcomes of the Iowa Public 
Employment Relations Act among groups of Iowa teachers, 
superintendents, and board members in the twenty-five 
largest pupil enrollment school districts, except 
Des Moines, as compared to those from the twenty-five 
smallest pupil enrollment school districts. 
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There are no differences in the expected instructional 
and noninstructional outcomes of the Iowa Public 
Employment Relations Act among Iowa elementary and 
secondary teachers relative to their differences in 
number of years of teaching experience. 
There are no differences in the expected instructional 
and noninstructional outcomes of the Iowa Public 
Employment Relations Act among Iowa elementally and 
secondary teachers relative to whether they are male 
or female. 
There are no differences in the expected instructional 
and noninstructional outcomes of the Iowa Public 
Employment Relations Act among Iowa teachers relative 
to whether the financial remuneration they receive 
from teaching is a primary or secondary source of 
family income. 
There are no differences in the expected instructional 
and noninstructional outcomes of the Iowa Public 
Employment Relations Act among Iowa teachers, super­
intendents, and board members in the study relative 
to whether or not the school district of which they 
are a part has a formal teacher bargaining unit. 
There are no differences in the expected instructional 
and noninstructional outcomes of the Iowa Public 
Employment Relations Act among superintendents in the 
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study relative to their differences in total years of 
experience as a school superintendent. 
Duncan's Multiple Range Test of homogenous subsets was 
then used to determine which group means for each scale were 
significantly different from the other group means for each of 
the above null hypotheses where more than two groups were being 
compared. 
Summary 
This chapter explained the major purpose and step-by-step 
procedure of the study in detail. The development of the 
questionnaire and the planned pilot study were described. The 
characteristics of the subjects in the sample were outlined 
and the method of the sample selection was detailed. The 
methods of data collection and treatment were reviewed. 
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CHAPTER IV. FINDINGS 
The major purpose of this investigation was to gather 
data so as to determine if there were significant differences 
in the expected instructional and noninstructional long-range 
outcomes of the Iowa Public Employment Relations Act as stated 
in the null hypotheses listed in the previous chapter. Follow­
ing the collection of data, the statistical analyses described 
in the previous chapter were conducted. The findings of those 
analyses, relative to the specific hypotheses of the study, 
are herein reported. 
Profile of the Respondents 
The profile of teacher respondents indicates a total of 
405 teachers responded to the questionnaire. The teachers 
were asked to indicate whether they are elementary (K-6) or 
secondary (7-12) teachers, whether their school district has a 
formal bargaining unit, their sex, total number of years of 
teaching experience, the size of school district in which they 
teach, and whether their teaching salary is a primary or 
secondary source of family income. Table 1 illustrates the 
number and percent of teachers indicating each variable. 
A total of forty-one superintendents responded to the 
survey. The superintendents were asked to indicate their total 
number of years of experience as a superintendent, whether 
their school district has a formal bargaining unit, and the 
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Table 1. Profile of teacher respondents 
Variables Number Percent of 
teacher respondents 
Position 
Elementary (K-6) 177 43.7 
Secondary (7-12) 228 56.3 
Bargaining unit 
Yes 275 67.9 
No 130 32.1 
Sex 
Male 140 34.6 
Female 265 65.4 
District size 
Twenty-five smallest 197 48.6 
Twenty-five largest 208 51.4 
Teaching experience 
0-5 years 116 28.6 
6-10 years 89 22.0 
11-15 years 65 16.0 
16-20 years 48 11.9 
More than 20 years 87 21.5 
Teaching salary 
Primary source of 
family income 285 70.4 
Secondary source of 
family income 120 29.6 
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size of school district in which they are superintendent. 
Table 2 illustrates the number and per cent of superintendents 
indicating each variable. 
A total of thirty-four board members responded to the 
survey. The board members were asked to indicate whether 
their school district has a bargaining unit and the size of 
school district in which they are a board member. Table 3 
illustrates the number and per cent of board members indicating 
each variable. 
Table 2. Profile of superintendent respondents 
Variables Number Percent of 
superintendent 
respondents 
District size 
Twenty-five smallest 
Twenty-five largest 
Bargaining unit 
16 
25 
39.0 
61.0 
Yes 
No 
28 
13 
68.3 
31.7 
Superintendent experience 
0-5 years 
6-10 years 
11-15 years 
16-20 years 
More than 20 years 
14 
4 
7 
5 
11 
34.1 
9.8 
17.1 
12.2 
26-8 
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Table 3. Profile of board member respondents 
Variables Number Percent of 
board member 
respondents 
District size 
Twenty-five smallest 11 32.4 
Twenty-five largest 23 67.6 
Bargaining unit 
Yes 27 79.4 
No 7 20.6 
Hypothesis Number One 
There are no significant differences in the 
expected instructional and noninstructional outcomes 
of the Iowa Public Employment Relations Act between 
and among groups of Iowa elementary teachers, 
secondary teachers, superintendents, and board 
members. 
The analysis of variance was used to determine the signifi­
cance of the mean differences between the groups on each of the 
scales as shown in Appendix C and are reported in Table 4. 
When reading and interpreting all tables in the remainder 
of Chapter IV, it must be remembered that mean scores were 
computed by assigning a value of 1 to the "strongly agree" 
response, a value of 2 to the "agree" response, a value of 3 
to the "neutral" response, a value of 4 to the "disagree" 
Table 4. Tests for significant differences between the groups by position with 
respect to the expected instructional and noninstructional outcome mean 
scores on each of the scales 
Scales 
Elementary 
teachers 
(n=177) 
Secondary 
teachers 
(n=228) 
Superintendents 
(n=41) 
Board 
members 
(n=34) 
F 
ratio 
Teacher-Superintendent/ 
Board Relations 3.0871 2.9851 3.9900 3.9515 64.704** 
Board Power 2.8314 2.7485 1.9837 2.2059 48.069** 
Job Satisfaction 3.2308 3.3599 2.2300 2.4328 57.831** 
Salary-Fringes 2.7344 2.5077 2.5793 2.7647 4.049* 
Instruction 2.9812 2.8188 3.8055 3.7189 44.824** 
Teacher Input 3.1537 3.1636 3.3400 3.2647 1.407 
Public Opinion 3.1965 3.1244 4.2800 4.0823 50.135** 
Working Conditions 2.5289 2.3425 2.3994 2.5341 5.933* 
Budget 2.7500 2.6586 2.6500 2.4853 1.796 
Political Involvement 2.2105 2.1894 1.6159 1.8603 18.115** 
Significant at the .05 level. 
* * 
Significant at the .01 level. 
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response, and a value of 5 to the "strongly disagree" response. 
On the scale Teacher-Superintendent/Board Relations in Table 4, 
for example, secondary teachers had an expected instructional 
and noninstructional outcome mean score of 2.9851 and superin­
tendents had a mean score of 3.9900. The secondary teachers' 
mean score should be interpreted as indicating slight agreement 
that teacher-superintendent/board relations will be improved as 
a result of teacher collective bargaining. The superintendents' 
mean score indicates disagreement that teacher-superintendent/ 
board relations will be improved as a result of teacher collec­
tive bargaining. All expected instructional and noninstruc­
tional outcome mean scores in the tables indicating F-ratios 
and those indicating Duncan's Multiple Range Test in the 
remainder of this chapter should be interpreted in the above 
manner. 
Only on the scales of questions relative to Teacher Input 
and Budget were there no significant differences between the 
groups, therefore, the null hypothesis was not rejected. Dif­
ferences in mean scores between the groups on the Salaries-
Fringes scale were significant at the .05 level and the null 
hypothesis was rejected. Differences in mean scores between 
the groups on all other scales were significant at the -01 
level and the null hypothesis was rejected. 
The Duncan Multiple Range Test was used to determine which 
of the forty differences between the group means were 
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significant and which were not. These results are reported in 
Table 5. 
On the Duncan Multiple Range Test of homogenous subsets it 
was found that for the scales Teacher-Superintendent/Board 
Relations and Public Opinion there was not a significant dif­
ference at the .05 level between the groups of elementary 
teachers and secondary teachers nor between superintendents 
and board members. There was a significant difference in the 
mean scores at the .05 level between the subsets elementary-
secondary teachers and superintendents-board members. 
For the scales Board Power and Political Involvement, 
there was no significant difference at the .05 level between 
the means of the groups of elementary teachers and secondary 
teachers. There were significant differences at the .05 level 
between the means of the groups of superintendents, board 
members and the subset of elementary-secondary teachers. 
For the scales Job Satisfaction and Instruction, there 
was no significant difference at the .05 level between the 
means of the groups of superintendents and board members, 
however, there were significant differences at the .05 level 
between the means of the groups of elementary teachers, 
secondary teachers, and the subset of superintendents-board 
members. 
For the scale Working Conditions, there were no signifi­
cant differences at the .05 level in the means of the groups 
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Table 5. Duncan ' s Multiple Range Test to determine which group 
means were significantly different where elementary 
teachers = Group 1; secondary teachers = Group 2 ; 
superintendents = Group 3; and board members = 
Group 4 
Scales Group means in ranges from 
smallest to largest* 
Teacher-Superintendent/ 
Board Relations Group 2 Group 1 
2.9851 3.0871 
Group 4 
3.9515 
Group 3 
3.9900 
Board Power 
Job Satisfaction 
Instruction 
Group 3 
1.9837 
Group 3 
2.2300 
Group 2 
2.8188 
Group 4 
2.2059 
Group 4 
2.4328 
Group 1 
2.9812 
Group 2 
2.7485 
Group 1 
3.2308 
Group 4 
3.7189 
Group 1 
2.8314 
Group 2 
3.3599 
Group 3 
3.8055 
Public Opinion Group 2 
3.1244 
Group 1 
3.1965 
Group 4 
4.0823 
Group 3 
4.2800 
Working Conditions Group 2 Group 3 Group 1 Group 4 
2.3425 2.3994 2.5289 2.5341 
Budget Group 4 Group 3 Group 2 Group 1 
2.4853 2.6500 2.6586 2.7500 
Political Involvement Group 3 Group 4 Group 2 Group 1 
1.6159 1.8603 2.1894 2.2105 
Any group means not underscored by the same line are 
significantly different at the .05 level. Any means under­
scored by the same line are not significantly different at the 
.05 level. 
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of secondary teachers and superintendents nor between the 
means of the groups of superintendents, elementary teachers, 
and board members. There was a significant difference at the 
.05 level between the means of the subsets secondary teachers-
superintendents and superintendents-elementary teachers-board 
members. 
For the scale Budget, there were no significant differ­
ences at the .05 level in the means of the groups of board 
members, superintendents and secondary teachers nor between 
the means of the group of superintendents, secondary teachers, 
and elementary teachers. There was a significant difference 
at the .05 level between the means of the subset board members-
superintendents-secondary teachers and subset superintendents-
secondary teachers-elementary teachers. As was indicated in 
Table 4, there were no significant differences at the .05 level 
between the groups of elementary teachers, secondary teachers, 
superintendents, and board members on the scales Teacher Input 
and Salaries-Fringes. 
Hypothesis Number Two 
There are no significant differences in the 
expected instructional and noninstructional outcomes 
of the Iowa Public Employment Relations Act among 
groups of teachers, superintendents, and board members 
in the twenty-five largest pupil enrollment school 
districts, except Des Moines, as compared to those in 
the twenty-five smallest pupil enrollment school 
districts. 
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The analysis of variance was used to determine the mean 
differences between teachers in large districts and those in 
small districts on each of the scales and are reported in 
Table 6. 
Only on the scales of questions relative to Salaries-
Fringes, Working Conditions, and Political Involvement were 
there significant differences at the .05 level between the 
mean responses of teachers in large districts and those in 
small districts and the null hypothesis was rejected. The mean 
differences were significant at the .01 level on the scales 
Salaries-Fringes and Political Involvement. Differences in 
mean scores between the groups of teachers in small districts 
and those in large districts on all other scales were not 
significant at the .05 level and the null hypothesis was not 
rejected. 
The analysis of variance was used to determine the signifi­
cance of the mean differences between superintendents in large 
districts and those in small districts on each of the scales 
and are reported in Table 7. 
Mean differences between small district superintendents 
and large district superintendents were significant at the .05 
level only on the scales Instruction, Teacher Input, and 
Political Involvement. The null hypothesis was rejected on 
these three scales. The null hypothesis was not rejected on 
all other scales since there was not a significant difference 
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Table 6. Tests for significant differences between teachers 
in large districts and those in small districts with 
respect to the expected instructional and non-
instructional outcome mean scores on the ten scales 
Scales 
Small 
district 
teachers 
(n=197) 
Large 
district 
teachers 
(n=2 08) 
F 
ratio 
Teacher-Superintendent/ 
Board Relations 3.0567 3.0048 0.854 
Board Power 2.8086 2.7626 0.982 
Job Satisfaction 3.2530 3.3512 2.572 
Salaries-Fringes 
Instruction 
Teacher Input 
Public Opinion 
Working Conditions 
Budget 
Political Involvement 
2.7270 
2.9165 
3.1451 
3.1867 
2.4981 
2.7183 
2.2982 
2.4927 
2.8640 
3.1730 
3.1264 
2.3504 
2.6796 
2.1039 
11.970** 
0.673 
0.261 
0.742 
9.702* 
0.346 
14.555** 
Significant at the .05 level. 
** 
Significant at the .01 level. 
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Table 7. Tests for significant differences between superin­
tendents in large districts and those in small 
districts with respect to the expected instructional 
and noninstructional outcome mean scores on the ten 
scales 
Scales 
Small district 
superintendents 
(n=16) 
Large district 
superintendents 
(n=25) 
F 
ratio 
Teacher-Superintendent/ 
Board Relations 3.8969 4.0521 1.994 
Board Power 2.0104 1.9667 0.085 
Job Satisfaction 2.2143 2.2400 0.030 
Salaries-Fringes 2.5156 2.6200 0.154 
Instruction 3.6181 3.9305 4.233* 
Teacher Input 2.9937 3.5708 6.462* 
Public Opinion 4.3000 4.2667 0.056 
Working Conditions 2.4609 2.3600 0.412 
Budget 2.7813 2.5625 1.280 
Political Involvement 1.8438 1.4700 5.050* 
*Significant at the .05 level. 
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at the .05 level between the mean responses of superintendents 
in large districts and those in small districts. 
The analysis of variance was used to determine the differ­
ences between the mean responses of board members in large 
districts as compared to those in small districts and is 
reported in Table 8. 
The small district board members' responses did differ 
significantly from large district board members on the Teacher 
Input and Public Opinion scales. There were no significant 
differences in responses between the two groups on the other 
eight scales. 
Hypothesis Number Three 
There are no differences in the expected 
instructional and noninstructional outcomes of the 
Iowa Public Employment Relations Act among Iowa 
elementary and secondary teachers relative to their 
differences in number of years of teaching 
experience. 
The analysis of variance was used to determine the mean 
differences on each of the ten expected outcome scales among 
elementary teachers relative to their differences in number of 
years of teaching experience. These are reported in Table 9. 
Mean differences of expected outcome scores among the 
elementary teachers in the study when compared relative to 
years of teaching experience were not significant on seven of 
the ten scales and the null hypothesis was not rejected. How­
ever, on three of the scales, Teacher-Superintendent/Board 
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Table 8. Tests for significant differences between board 
members from small districts as compared to those 
from large districts with respect to the expected 
instructional and noninstructional outcome mean 
scores on the ten scales 
Scales 
Small district Large district F 
board members board members ratio 
(n=ll) (n=23) 
Teacher-Superintendent/ 
Board Relations 
Board Power 
Job Satisfaction 
Salaries-Fringes 
Instruction 
Teacher Input 
Public Opinion 
Working Conditions 
Budget 
Political Involvement 
3.9227 
2.2576 
2.4026 
2.5909 
3.4949 
2.6000 
3.8000 
2.3875 
2.4091 
2.1364 
3.9652 
2.1812 
2.4472 
2.8478 
3.8261 
4.2174 
2.5978 
2.5217 
1.7283 
0.049 
0.116 
0.035 
0.855 
3.116 
3.5826 17.192** 
4.591* 
3.310 
0.221 
3.594 
* 
Significant at the .05 level. 
** 
Significant at the .01 level. 
Table 9. Tests for significant differences between groups of elementary teachers 
relative to their differences in number of years of teaching experience 
with respect to the expected instructional and noninstructional outcome 
mean scores on the ten scales 
0-5 5-10 11-15 16-20 20+ F 
Scales years years years years years ratio 
(n=43) (n=39) (n=25) (n=31) (n=39) 
Teacher-Superintendent/ 
Board Relations 2. 7942 3. 0703 3. 3180 3. 2578 3. 1395 4. 326** 
Board Power 2. 9031 2. 8246 2. 8467 2. 6771 2. 8761 1. 100 
Job Satisfaction 3. 4120 3. 2782 3. 0457 3. 0714 3. 2344 1. 983 
Salaries-Fringes 2. 6105 2. 6776 3. 0000 2. 7656 2. 7303 1. 214 
Instruction 2. 7519 2. 9854 3. 2176 3. 0963 2. 9970 2. 159 
Teacher Input 3. 0233 3. 2184 3. 2913 3. 2125 3. 1027 1. 212 
Public Opinion 2. 8977 3. 0947 3. 4080 3. 2903 3. 4210 3. 665** 
Working Conditions 2. 5669 2. 4178 2. 7604 2. 4718 2. 4966 1. 701 
Budget 2. 7442 2. 9211 2. 7000 2. 6290 2. 7179 0. 866 
Political Involvement 2. 4419 2. 1316 2. 1500 2. 1484 2. 1218 2. 873* 
"k 
significant at the .05 level. 
** 
Significant at the .01 level. 
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Relations, Public Opinion, and Political Involvement, there 
was a significant difference in the mean responses among the 
experience groups of elementary teachers. 
The Duncan Multiple Range Test of homogenous subsets, 
reported in Table 10, indicates which experience group subsets 
on each of the three scales with significant differences were 
significantly different from the other experience group sub­
sets. On all three scales, the group of elementary teachers 
with less than five years of experience was the experience 
group which indicated a significant difference in expected out­
come mean scores. 
As Table 11 indicates, few differences were noted among 
the secondary teachers when mean scores of the experience 
groups were compared using the analysis of variance. Only on 
the scales of Job Satisfaction and Public Opinion was there a 
significant mean score difference at the .05 level between the 
experience groups. 
Table 12 shows the results of the Duncan Multiple Range 
Test for the two scales in which there were significant dif­
ferences between the mean scores of the subsets of experience 
groups. On the scale of Job Satisfaction the secondary 
teachers in the experience group with more than twenty years 
experience had a significantly different mean score than 
teachers in the other experience groups. On the Public Opinion 
scale, the Duncan's Test showed three subsets of experience 
Table 10. Duncan's Multiple Range Test of experience group means among elementary 
teachers on three scales with significant expected outcome mean scores 
where elementary teachers with 0-5 years experience = Group 1; 6-10 years 
= Group 2; 11-15 years = Group 3; 16-20 years = Group 4; and 20 or more 
years = Group 5 
Scales Group means in ranges from smallest to largest* 
Teacher-Superintendent/ 
Board Relations Group 1 Group 2 Group 5 Group 4 Group 3 
2.7942 3.0703 3.1395 3.2578 3.3180 
Public Opinion Group 1 Group 2 Group 4 Group 3 Group 5 
2.8977 3.0947 3.2903 3.4080 3.4210 
Political Involvement Group 5 Group 2 Group 4 Group 3 Group 1 
2.1218 2.1316 2.1484 2.1500 2,4419 
Any group means not underscored by the same line are significantly different 
at the .05 level. Any group means underscored by the same line are not significantly 
different at the .05 level. 
Table 11. Tests for significant differences between groups of secondary teachers 
relative to their differences in number of years of teaching experience 
with respect to the expected instructional and noninstructional outcome 
mean scores on the ten scales 
0-5 6-10 11-15 16-20 20+ F 
Scales years years years years years ratio 
(n=73) (n=50) (n=40) (n=17) (n=48) 
Teacher-Superintendent/ 
Board Relations 2. 9627 2. 9245 2. 8692 3. 1687 3. 1244 2. 159 
Board Power 2. 7014 2. 8300 2. 7375 2. 8437 2. 7101 0. 918 
Job Satisfaction 3. 3953 3. 4734 3. 4725 3. 2857 3. 1190 3. 040* 
Salaries-Fringes 2. 3715 2. 6520 2. 5577 2. 7031 2. 4531 2. 038 
Instruction 2. 6895 2. 7846 2. 8918 2. 9259 2. 9622 1. 988 
Teacher Input 3. 0479 3. 2882 3. 1744 3. 1750 3. 1957 1. 645 
Public Opinion 2. 9889 3. 0200 3. 2769 3. 5125 3. 1833 3. 129* 
Working Conditions 2. 2688 2. 4681 2. 2949 2. 2969 2. 3750 2. 082 
Budget 2. 5959 2. 7451 2. 5897 2. 8750 2. 6458 1. 020 
Political Involvement 2. 1952 2. 2794 2. 0769 2. 0625 2. 2188 1. 136 
* 
Significant at the .05 level. 
** 
significant at the .01 level. 
Table 12. Duncan's Multiple Range Test of experience group means among secondary 
teachers on two scales with significant expected outcome mean scores where 
secondary teachers with 0-5 years experience = Group 1; 6-10 years = Group 
2; 11-15 years = Group 3; 16-20 years = Group 4; and 20 or more years = 
Group 5 
Scales Group means in ranges from smallest to largest* 
Job Satisfaction Group 5 
3.1190 
Group 4 
3.2857 
Group 1 
3.3953 
Group 3 
3.4725 
Group 2 
3.4734 
Public Opinion Group 1 
2.9889 
Group 2 
3.0200 
Group 5 
3.1833 
Group 3 
3.2769 
Group 4 
3.5125 
Any group means not underscored by the same line are significantly different at 
the ,05 level. Any group means underscored by the same line are not significantly 
different at the .05 level. 
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groups with similar mean scores with the most significant dif­
ference being between teachers with less than five years of 
teaching experience and those with sixteen to twenty years of 
experience. 
Hypothesis Number Four 
There are no differences in the expected outcomes 
of the Iowa Public Enployment Relations Act among Iowa 
elementary and secondary teachers relative to whether 
they are male or female. 
Using the analysis of variance with the F scale, it was 
determined that there were no significant differences among the 
mean scores of elementary teachers relative to their differ­
ences in sex or among secondary teachers relative to their 
differences in sex. The comparison of mean differences and F 
ratios for each of the scales are shown for elementary teachers 
and secondary teachers in Tables 13 and 14 respectively. The 
null hypothesis was not rejected. 
Hypothesis Number Five 
There are no differences in the expected 
instructional and noninstructional outcomes of the 
Iowa Public Eir^loyment Relations Act among Iowa 
teachers relative to whether the financial 
remuneration they receive from teaching is a primary 
or secondary source of family income. 
The analysis of variance with the F ratio was used to test 
for differences between the expected outcome mean scores of 
teachers whose financial remuneration for teaching is a primary 
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Table 13. Tests for significant differences among elementary 
teachers relative to their differences in sex with 
respect to the expected instructional and non-
instructional outcome mean scores on the ten scales 
Scales Male 
(n=ll) 
Female 
(n=166) 
F 
ratio 
Teacher-Superintendent/ 
Board Relations 
Board Power 
Job Satisfaction 
Salaries-Fringes 
Instruction 
Teacher Input 
Public Opinion 
Working Conditions 
Budget 
Political Involvement 
3.1864 
3.0909 
3.1039 
2.4545 
3.1556 
3.3182 
3.4182 
2.4545 
2.7727 
2.2045 
3.0804 
2.8142 
3.2392 
2.7530 
2.9705 
3.1425 
3.1817 
2.5339 
2.7485 
2.2108 
0.306 
3.284 
0.464 
1.728 
0.677 
1.001 
1.057 
0.221 
0.012 
0.003 
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Table 14. Tests for significant differences among secondary 
teachers relative to their differences in sex with 
respect to the expected instructional and non-
instructional outcome mean scores on the ten scales 
Scales Males 
(n=129) 
Female 
(n=99) 
F 
ratio 
Teacher-Superintendent/ 
Board Relations 
Board Power 
Job Satisfaction 
Salaries-Fringes 
Instruction 
Teacher Input 
Public Opinion 
Working Conditions 
Budget 
Political Involvement 
2.9859 
2.7900 
3.3510 
2.5291 
2.8463 
3.1899 
3.1250 
2.3624 
2.6279 
2.1473 
2.9840 
2.6941 
3.3717 
2.4794 
2.7813 
3.1288 
3.1237 
2.3163 
2.6990 
2.2449 
0 . 0 0 0  
2.627 
0.067 
0.335 
0.682 
0.735 
0 . 0 0 0  
0.703 
0.712 
2 . 0 0 0  
71 
source of family income and those for which it is a secondary 
source of family income. As Table 15 shows, there were no 
significant differences in mean scores at the .05 level on 
nine of the ten scales. On those nine scales. Hypothesis 
Nvr^ber Five, could not be rejected. However, on the scale of 
expected outcome statements relative to Budget, there was a 
significant difference between mean scores of teachers whose 
salary from teaching is a primary source of family income and 
those for which it is not. The null hypothesis was rejected 
for the Budget scale. 
Hypothesis Number Six 
There are no differences in the expected 
instructional and noninstructional outcomes of the 
Iowa Public Employment Relations Act among Iowa 
teachers, superintendents, and board members in 
the study relative to whether or not the school 
district of which they are a part has a formal 
teacher bargaining unit. 
The Iowa Public Employment Relations Act has given 
teachers in Iowa the right to bargain collectively with school 
boards since July 1, 1975. While teachers in a majority of 
the school districts in Iowa have elected to be recognized as 
formal bargaining units by the Public Employment Relations 
Board and bargain collectively with their boards of education, 
there are still a considerable number of Iowa school districts 
where the majority of the teachers have remained content to 
resolve their conditions of employment by means other than 
Table 15. Tests for significant differences among Iowa teachers relative to whether 
the financial remuneration they receive from teaching is a primary or 
secondary source of family income with respect to the expected 
instructional and noninstructional outcome mean scores on the ten scales 
Teaching salary 
Scales 
Primary source 
of family income 
(n=285) 
Secondary source 
of family income 
(n=120) 
F 
ratio 
Teacher-Superintendent/ 
Board Relations 3.0014 3.0995 2.552 
Board Power 2.8090 2.7291 2.478 
Job Satisfaction 3.3378 3.2208 3.030 
Salaries-Fringes 2.5775 2.6780 1.781 
Instruction 2.8500 2.9846 3.706 
Teacher Input 3.1460 3.1914 0.575 
Public Opinion 3.1180 3.2478 2.869 
Working Conditions 2.4014 2.4763 2.016 
Budget 2.6474 2.8220 5.949* 
Political Involvement 2.1675 2.2731 3.476 
* 
Significant at the .05 level. 
73 
those delineated under the Iowa Public Employment Relations 
Act. 
Of the twenty-five large pupil enrollment districts in 
the study, the teachers in each of the districts had elected 
to form a bargaining unit and bargain collectively according 
to the provisions of the teacher collective bargaining law. 
Teachers in the twenty-five small pupil enrollment districts 
in the investigation were less inclined to adopt the formal 
collective bargaining procedures of the Public Employment 
Relations Act. Teachers in only four of the twenty-five small 
pupil enrollment districts had elected to bargain formally 
under the provisions of the Public Employment Relations Act. 
Hypothesis Number Six was tested using the analysis of 
variance for each of the ten expected outcome scales. Mean 
responses and F ratios among teachers from bargaining and non-
bargaining school districts are shown in Table 16. 
Differences in mean scores on seven of the ten expected 
outcome scales were found to be significant at the .05 level or 
greater. Most notably, differences on mean scales between 
bargaining and nonbargaining teachers on three of the expected 
outcome scales were significant at the .01 level. On all seven 
of these expected outcome scales, Teacher-Superintendent/Board 
Relations, Board Power, Job Satisfaction, Salaries-Fringes, 
Teacher Input, Working Conditions, and Political Involvement, 
the null hypothesis was rejected. On the expected outcome 
Table 16. Tests for significant differences between teachers from bargaining and non-
bargaining districts with respect to the expected instructional and non-
instructional outcome mean scores on the ten scales 
Scales 
With a 
formal teacher 
bargaining unit 
(n=275) 
Without a 
formal teacher 
bargaining unit 
(n=130) 
F 
ratio 
Teacher-Superintendent/ 
Board Relations 2.9746 3.1480 8.495** 
Board Power 2.7170 2.8173 4.088* 
Job Satisfaction 3.1483 3.3769 12.488** 
Salaries-Fringes 2.5311 2.7674 10.582** 
Instruction 2.8622 2.9475 1.557 
Teacher Input 3.2003 3.0726 4.824* 
Public Opinion 3.1114 3.2496 3.435 
Working Conditions 2.3889 2.4942 4.272* 
Budget 2.6960 2.7038 0.012 
Political Involvement 2.1578 2.2846 5.290* 
Significant at the .05 level. 
* * 
Significant at the .01 level. 
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scales of Instruction, Public Opinion, and Budget the investi­
gation was unable to reject the null hypothesis for teachers. 
Mean responses and F ratios for each of the ten expected 
outcome scales between groups of superintendents from bargain­
ing and nonbargaining school districts are shown in Table 17. 
Differences in mean scores between superintendents from 
bargaining and nonbargaining districts appear to be less 
divergent than between teachers from bargaining and non-
bargaining districts. Significant differences in mean scores 
between the two groups of superintendents were at the . 05 level 
on three of the scales and at the .01 level on one scale. The 
investigation was unable to reject the null hypothesis on each 
of the other six expected outcome scales. 
Sven fewer differences were noted between the mean scores 
of board members from bargaining and nonbargaining school 
districts. Table 18 shows that the null hypothesis was able 
to be rejected on one of the expected outcome scales. Teacher 
Input, when the mean responses of the two groups of board 
members were compared. The investigation of board members mean 
responses on each of the nine remaining scales failed to reject 
the null hypothesis. 
Table 17. Tests for significant differences between superintendents from bargaining 
and nonbargaining districts with respect to the expected instructional 
and noninstructional outcome mean scores on the ten scales 
Scales 
With a 
formal teacher 
bargaining unit 
(n=28) 
Without a 
formal teacher 
bargaining unit 
(n=13) 
F 
ratio 
Teacher-Superintendent/ 
Board Relations 4.0704 3.8231 4.974* 
Board Power 1.9345 2.0897 0.995 
Job Satisfaction 2.1990 2.2967 0.398 
Salaries-Fringes 2.5982 2.5385 0. 046 
Instruction 3.9218 3.5641 5.183* 
Teacher Input 3.4815 3.0461 3.108 
Public Opinion 4.3185 4.2000 0.655 
Working Conditions 2.3036 2.6058 3.636 
Budget 2.5185 2.9231 4.309* 
Political Involvement 1.4464 1.9808 10.570** 
* 
significant at the .05 level. 
Significant at the .01 level. 
Table 18. Tests for significant differences between board members from bargaining 
and nonbargaining districts with respect to the expected instructional 
and noninstructional outcome mean scores on the ten scales 
Scales 
With a 
formal teacher 
bargaining unit 
(n=28) 
Without a 
formal teacher 
bargaining unit 
(n=7) 
F 
ratio 
Teacher-Superintendent/ 
Board Relations 3.9518 3.9500 0.0 
Board Power 2.1790 2.3095 0.254 
Job Satisfaction 2.4286 2.4490 0.005 
Salaries-Fringes 2.8056 2.6071 0.375 
Instruction 3.7737 3.5079 1.427 
Teacher Input 3.4593 2.5143 10.186** 
Public Opinion 4.1185 3.9429 0.540 
Working Conditions 2.5721 2.3929 1.820 
Budget 2.5185 2.3571 0.341 
Political Involvement 1.7685 2.2143 3.165 
** 
Significant at the .01 level. 
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Hypothesis Number Seven 
There are no significant differences in the 
expected instructional and noninstructional out­
comes of the Iowa Public Employment Relations Act 
among superintendents in the study relative to 
their differences in total years of experience as 
a school superintendent. 
The forty-one superintendents included in the investiga­
tion represented a broad range of years of experience in the 
superintendency. The null hypothesis relative to the mean 
differences on each of the expected outcome scales between 
groups of superintendents with varying lengths of superin­
tendent experience was unable to be rejected for nine of ten 
scales. Only on the expected outcome scale Job Satisfaction, 
was there a significant difference in mean scores at the .05 
level among the superintendents and the null hypothesis was 
rejected. 
The results of the Duncan's Multiple Range Test shown in 
Table 20 show that on the Job Satisfaction scale the homogeneous 
subset of superintendent experience groups including superin­
tendents with 20 or i»ore, 16-20, 11-15, and 6-10 years of 
experience were significantly different from the homogeneous 
subset composed of superintendent experience groups including 
superintendents with 11-15, 6-10, and 0-5 years of experience. 
Even though the Iowa Public Engloyment Relations Act was 
implemented only two years ago, the investigation indicates 
that superintendents with coirç»aratively long amounts of 
Table 19. Tests for significant differences among superintendents relative to years 
of experience as a superintendent with respect to the expected instruc­
tional and noninstructional outcome mean scores on the ten scales 
Year of experience as a superintendent 
Scales 0-5 6-10 11-15 16-20 20+ P 
years years years years years ratio 
(n=14) (n=4) (n=7) (n=5) (n=ll) 
Teacher-Superintendent/ 
Board Relations 3. 8731 3. 8000 4. 0071 4. 0300 4. 1682 1. 507 
Board Power 2. 0476 2. 2500 2. 0952 1. 8000 1. 8182 1. 049 
Job Satisfaction 2. 5000 2. 1071 2. 3469 2. 0000 1. 9610 3. 265* 
Salaries-Fringes 2. 4286 2. 6875 3. 1071 2. 5000 2. 4318 0. 951 
Instruction 3. 7302 3. 4722 4. 0317 3. 7556 3. 9111 1. 054 
Teacher Input 3. 4615 3. 1500 3. 4429 2. 8000 3. 4455 0. 871 
Public Opinion 4. 3286 3. 9500 4. 2286 4. 2400 4. 4000 0. 843 
Working Conditions 2. 3839 2. 5000 2. 6429 2. 1750 2. 3295 0. 787 
Budget 2. 5714 2. 3750 2. 6429 3. 0000 2. 7000 0. 687 
Political Involvement 1. 5536 1. 9375 1. 5714 1. 9000 1. 4773 0. 915 
Significant at the .05 level. 
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Table 20. Duncan's Multiple Range Test of experience group 
means among superintendents on scales with signifi­
cant expected outcome mean scores were superinten­
dents with 0-5 years experience = Group 1; 6-10 
years = Group 2; 11-15 years = Group 3; 16-20 years 
= Group 4; and 20 or more years = Group 5 
Group means in ranges from 
smallest to largest* 
Job Satisfaction Group 5 Group 4 Group 2 Group 3 Group 1 
1.9610 2.0000 2.1071 2.3469 2.5000 
* 
Any group means not underscored by the same line are 
significantly different at the .05 level. Any group means 
underscored by the same line are not significantly different 
at the .05 level. 
superintendent experience have generally the same expectations 
regarding the long-range outcomes of teacher collective 
bargaining as do their colleagues with lesser amounts of super­
intendent experience. 
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CHAPTER V. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Summary 
Teacher collective bargaining has become a reality for a 
majority of Iowa school districts. For these districts, and 
others who will join them, teacher collective bargaining is an 
annual process to determine the terms of teacher employment. 
The goal in most annual negotiations is to bargain the next 
year's contract. It appears that boards of education or 
teachers do little long-range planning of bargaining objectives. 
It also appears that no one is thoughtfully considering the 
long-range outcomes of teacher collective bargaining. 
Logically, it could be quite possible that a series of 
one year contracts could lead to results which would be 
undesirable for teachers, superintendents, board members, and 
education as a whole. In spite of what often appears to be an 
adversary relationship between teachers and board representa­
tives during annual bargaining sessions, the long-range 
objectives between and among both groups may not be dissimilar. 
That is what this investigation set out to determine. 
In the preceding sections, the hypotheses of this investi­
gation have been stated in the null form. However, for 
purposes of this summary they are now stated in the question 
form. 
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There were five basic questions in this investigation. 
1. Do Iowa elementary teachers, secondary teachers, 
superintendents, and board members differ from each 
other in terms of what each group expects the long-
range outcomes of teacher collective bargaining to be? 
2. Do teachers, superintendents, and board members in 
Iowa's twenty-five smallest school districts expect 
different long-range outcomes of teacher collective 
bargaining than do their counterparts in the twenty-
five largest school districts? 
3. Are there differences in the expected outcomes of 
teacher collective bargaining among Iowa's elementary 
and secondary teachers relative to their differences 
in years of teaching experience, sex, and whether the 
salary they receive from teaching is a primary or 
secondary source of family income? 
4. Do Iowa teachers, superintendents and board members 
in bargaining districts differ in their expected 
outcomes of teacher collective bargaining from those 
in nonbargaining districts? 
5. Are there differences in the expected long-range 
outcomes of teacher collective bargaining among Iowa 
superintendents relative to differences in years of 
experience as a superintendent? 
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The Collective Bargaining Survey used to collect the data 
needed to answer the questions was developed relative to 
information obtained from the review of literature, input from 
an Iowa State University graduate class entitled Administration 
of School Personnel, and input received from the pilot study. 
The survey instrument consisted of two major parts. The first 
was designed to collect various demographic information regard­
ing each of the respondents. Specifically, the respondents 
were asked to provide the following data: sex, number of years 
in teaching, and whether the financial remuneration received 
from teaching is a primary or secondary source of family income 
from the teacher respondents; years of experience as a super­
intendent from the superintendent respondents ; and whether the 
school district of which the respondent is a part has a formal 
teacher bargaining unit. 
The second part of the Collective Bargaining Survey con­
sisted of seventy-five "expected outcome" statements. Each 
respondent was asked to respond to each statement on a five 
point scale of "strongly agree," "agree," "neutral," "disagree," 
or "strongly disagree." For the purposes of reporting the 
findings of the investigation, the seventy-five "expected out­
come" statements were grouped into ten scales as shown in 
Appendix C. The ten scales were Teacher-Superintendent/Board 
Relations, Board Power, Job Satisfaction, Salary-Fringes, In­
struction, Teacher Input, Public Opinion, Working Conditions, 
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Budget, and Political Involvement. 
The grouping of the statements into scales was done by 
the investigator first by placing what appeared to be related 
statements in scales and assigning appropriate descriptive 
titles to the scales. Using data from the pilot study, corre­
lation coefficients were then computed for each item comparing 
that item to its assigned scale and to each other scale. Based 
upon the results of the item to scale correlation tests, minor 
changes were made in item-scale assignments. Following the 
correlation of data from the actual investigation sample, 
correlation coefficients were again confuted comparing each 
expected outcome statement to its assigned scale and each 
other scale. No further changes in item-scale assignments were 
made. 
The statistical treatment of the data used to test each of 
the null hypotheses was then applied to each of the scales 
relative to the various respondent groups. Respondents were 
grouped for statistical comparison according to school district 
enrollment, position, bargaining unit and the specific demo­
graphic characteristics earlier described. The one way 
analysis of variance using the F ratio was used to test each 
of the hypotheses. Duncan's Multiple Range Test of homogenous 
subsets was used to determine which groups or subsets were 
different from others when comparisons between more than two 
groups were being made. 
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The findings from the statistical treatment of data was 
reported in tables using group mean scores and the F ratios to 
show any existing differences between and among groups relative 
to their teacher collective bargaining expected outcomes. 
Score differences were reported using the .05 and .01 levels 
of significance. 
Question one 
"Do Iowa elementary teachers, secondary teachers, 
superintendents, and board members differ from each 
other in terms of what each group expects the long-
range outcomes of teacher collective bargaining to be?" 
The F test for eight of ten scales showed significant 
differences in the long-range expected outcomes between the 
groups. On the scale Teacher-Superintendent/Board Relations, 
there was no difference between elementary teachers and 
secondary teachers relative to their long-range expected out­
comes. There was also no difference between superintendents 
and board members. However, the elementary and secondary 
teachers had very different expectations than did superintend­
ents and board members. The teachers felt more positive toward 
the concept that teacher collective bargaining would improve 
working relationships between teachers and superintendents-
boards of education. Superintendents and board members dis­
agreed. Differences in expected outcomes relative to Board 
Power were highly significant. The elementary and secondary 
teachers held similar opinions in that they did not expect 
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collective bargaining to diminish board authority. Board 
members indicated a significantly different opinion from the 
teachers. They believed that board authority would be 
diminished by collective bargaining. Superintendents indicated 
significantly stronger feelings than even board members that 
bargaining would reduce the power of boards of education in 
making decisions regarding the operation of the schools. 
The groups of respondents also indicated strong differ­
ences of opinion on the expected outcome statements which 
dealt with job satisfaction. Superintendents and board members 
agreed that teacher collective bargaining would reduce job 
satisfaction for teachers and themselves. The teachers, how­
ever, did not view collective bargaining as a deterrent to job 
satisfaction. The teachers' expectations relative to job 
satisfaction for all groups was different from the superin­
tendents' and board members' at a highly significant level. 
Secondary teachers felt significantly more positive than even 
elementary teachers that collective bargaining would have a 
positive effect on the job satisfaction of the respective 
school roles. 
All four groups expected that a result of teacher collec­
tive bargaining will be substantially increased salaries and 
fringe benefits for teachers. Secondary teachers and superin­
tendents felt more strongly than did elementary teachers and 
board members regarding this issue. The elementary teachers 
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and board members felt significantly less certain that collec­
tive negotiations would bring about increased teacher salaries 
and fringe benefits. 
The elementary and secondary teachers in the study held 
the opinion that a long-range outcome of teacher collective 
bargaining will be improved classroom instruction. Superin­
tendents and board members disagreed at a highly significant 
level. 
On the scale of statements relative to Public Opinion, 
elementary and secondary teachers were in agreement that teacher 
collective bargaining would not have a long-range detrimental 
effect upon the views that the public has of teachers and educa­
tion in general. Superintendents and board members did not 
agree with the teachers and indicated a strong opinion that 
teacher collective bargaining would have a long-range negative 
effect on the esteem with which the public views teachers and 
public education as a whole. 
Secondary teachers and superintendents were in agreement 
that working conditions for teachers would improve as a result 
of teacher collective bargaining. Elementary teachers and 
board members were not as certain that working conditions 
would be improved. Even though their expectations differed 
significantly from secondary teachers and superintendents, 
they still indicated a belief that working conditions would be 
improved because of collective bargaining. 
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All four groups believed that teacher collective bargain­
ing would lead to greater political involvement by all factions 
in public education. Board members and superintendents, how­
ever, had significantly stronger opinions regarding this issue 
than did the teachers. 
Other than on the scales of Budget and Teacher Input, the 
groups of respondents did differ in their long-range expected 
outcomes of teacher collective bargaining. Most often when two 
of the groups did agree on their expectations, it was the two 
groups of teachers agreeing and the superintendents and board 
members agreeing. In general, the answer to question one is 
"yes." 
Question two 
"Do teachers, superintendents, and board members in 
Iowa's twenty-five smallest school districts expect 
different long-range outcomes of teacher collective 
bargaining than do their counterparts in the twenty-
five largest school districts?" 
There are 449 public school districts in Iowa. Excluding 
the Des Moines Independent Community School District, they 
range in total enrollment size from less than 200 to more than 
22,000 students. Certainly, with this large a range in school 
district enrollment size, the question as to whether teachers, 
superintendents, and board members in large districts may have 
different opinions from those held by teachers, superintendents, 
and board members in small districts raises some speculation. 
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When small school district teachers in the study were 
compared to large school district teachers with respect to 
both groups' long-range expected outcomes of teacher collective 
bargaining, significant differences were noted on only three of 
the scales. On the scale of questions regarding Salaries-
Fringes, small school teachers were significantly less optimis­
tic that collective bargaining would result in substantially 
increased salaries and fringe benefits than were their col­
leagues in the large school districts. Large school district 
teachers believe quite strongly that collective bargaining will 
have a long-range positive effect for them relative to salaries 
and fringe benefits. 
On the scale of Working Conditions, teachers from large 
school districts were significantly more positive that working 
conditions would be improved through collective bargaining. 
While small district teachers did not disagree that collective 
bargaining would improve working conditions, they were cer­
tainly not as optimistic as their colleagues from the large 
schools. 
All teachers in the study definitely believe that teacher 
collective bargaining will lead to greater involvement by 
groups of teachers, superintendents, and board members in local 
and state politics. Teachers from large districts did, however, 
express a significantly stronger opinion than teachers from 
small districts that teacher collective bargaining would lead 
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to greater political involvement by teachers, superintendents, 
and board members. 
On the other seven scales ; Teacher-Superintendent/Board 
Relations, Board Power, Job Satisfaction, Instruction, Teacher 
Input, Public Opinion, and Budget; no significant differences 
were found to exist between the two groups. It is worth 
noting, however, that on all seven scales, the slight differ­
ences in the expected outcome mean scores indicated a less 
optimistic attitude toward teacher collective bargaining by 
teachers from small school districts. 
The long-range expected outcomes of superintendents in 
large pupil enrollment school districts were compared to those 
of superintendents in small pupil enrollment school districts. 
There were significant differences on three of the scales— 
Instruction, Teacher Input, and political Involvement. 
On the expected outcome statements relative to instruction, 
both groups of superintendents indicated that they believed the 
long-range effect of teacher collective bargaining on instruc­
tion would be negative. Large school superintendents indicated 
to a significantly greater extent than their small school 
colleagues that collective bargaining would adversely effect 
classroom instruction. 
There was a significant difference between the two groups' 
expectations relative to the amount of input teachers will have 
in regard to the operation of the school. Small school 
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superintendents agreed that teachers will have a greater impact 
on decisions relative to the operation of the school as a 
result of teacher collective bargaining. Large school superin­
tendents did not agree that, as a result of teacher collective 
bargaining, teachers would have greater input into school 
district decisions. 
Both groups of superintendents agreed that teacher collec­
tive bargaining would lead to greater political involvement by 
groups representing teachers, superintendents, and boards of 
education. Large school superintendents indicated a signifi­
cantly stronger agreement with the expected outcome statements 
dealing with political involvement than did their small school 
counterparts. 
On the other seven scales, there were no significant 
differences between the expected outcomes of the two groups of 
superintendents. Within each of these seven scales, there 
were slight differences in the expected outcome mean scores 
between the two groups, however, no distinct pattern of one 
group having more positive or negative expectations relative 
to teacher collective bargaining was evident. 
Board members from small school districts as compared to 
those from large school districts were even less divided in 
terms of the long-range expected outcomes than were teachers 
and superintendents. Generally, however, board members from 
the large school districts expressed opinions which reflected 
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their belief that collective bargaining is not going to bring 
about long-range positive effects for teachers or education. 
In the area of Teacher Input, large district board members 
expressed significantly different expectations than the small 
district board members. The board members of large schools 
did not believe that teacher input into the operation of the 
school would be increased as a result of collective bargaining. 
Small district board members indicated they believed that 
teacher input would be increased as a result of collective 
bargaining. 
According to the large district board members, negative 
public opinion toward teachers, teacher demands, and education 
in general will be sharply increased as a result of teacher 
negotiations. While small district board members agree with 
their large school district counterparts to some extent, their 
opinions regarding the effects of collective bargaining on 
public opinion are significantly less negative than those of 
the large school board members. 
Differences in long-range expected outcomes of teacher 
collective bargaining between teachers, superintendents, and 
board members from small school districts and those from large 
school districts did exist. Teachers in small districts 
generally feel less optimistic about the positive effects of 
collective bargaining for themselves and education in general 
than do large district teachers. Small school district 
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superintendents and board members, conversely, feel less 
pessimistic regarding the long-range effects of teacher col­
lective bargaining on both teachers and the educational system 
than do their large school counterparts. The answer, in 
general, to question two is "yes." 
Question three 
"Are there differences in the expected outcomes of 
teacher collective bargaining among Iowa's elementary 
and secondary teachers relative to their differences 
in years of teaching experience, sex, and whether the 
salary they receive from teaching is a primary or 
secondary source of family income?" 
Elementary and secondary teachers were considered as 
separate groups in analyzing the data relative to the effect 
that years of teaching experience, sex, and salary had on 
teachers opinions regarding the long-range outcomes of teacher 
collective bargaining. 
Comparisons among the groups of elementary and secondary 
teachers relative to years of teaching experience were done by 
further dividing each group of teachers into experience groups. 
The experience groups were made up of teachers with 0-5 years 
of experience, 6-10 years of experience, 11-15 years of 
experience, 16-20 years of experience, and 20 or more years of 
experience. 
On the scales Teacher-Superintendent/Board Relations, 
Public Opinion, and Political Involvement elementary teachers 
who had five or fewer years of teaching experience had 
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significantly different expected outcome mean scores than 
elementary teachers in the other experience groups. The 
elementary teachers with 0-5 years of teaching experience 
believed that collective bargaining will result in improved 
relations between teachers, superintendents, and board members. 
Elementary teachers with more years of experience were more 
inclined to believe that teacher collective bargaining would 
not in^rove teacher-superintendent/board relations. 
Elementary teachers with fewer years of teaching 
experience, particularly those with five or less years of 
teaching experience, believed that public opinion toward 
teachers, teacher demands, and education in general will be 
improved as a result of collective bargaining. Teachers with 
more years of experience, particularly those with more than 
ten years experience, disagreed with their less experienced 
colleagues. 
Elementary teachers with 0-5 years of experience were 
less inclined to expect a long-range outcome of collective 
bargaining to be increased political involvement by those 
involved in the educational process. All other elementary 
teachers expressed a strong opinion that collective bargaining 
will result in increased political involvement. 
Although there were no significant differences among 
elementary teachers on each of the seven other expected outcome 
scales when years of teaching experience was a variable. 
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teachers with less experience did indicate slightly more 
optimistic views toward what collective bargaining could bring 
about for teachers and education in general. 
Comparisons of expected outcomes of collective bargaining 
among secondary teachers when years of teaching experience is 
a variable indicated some of the same differences as existed 
among elementary teachers. 
Secondary teachers in the 0-5 years of experience group 
were significantly different from the more experienced 
secondary teachers in their belief that job satisfaction would 
be increased as a result of collective bargaining. All second­
ary teachers tended to believe that collective bargaining will 
increase job satisfaction, but not to the extent that the 
least experienced teachers indicated. 
The least experienced group of secondary teachers also 
expected that teacher collective bargaining will improve public 
opinion toward teachers, teacher demands, and education in 
general. Teachers with more experience tended to disagree that 
public opinion will be iitçjroved as a result of collective 
bargaining. 
As was true among elementary teachers, secondary teachers 
with less years of experience were generally more optimistic 
regarding the outcomes of teacher collective bargaining on all 
scales than were the more experienced secondary teachers. 
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When sex of the teacher was a variable, no significant 
differences in long-range expected outcomes of teacher collec­
tive bargaining between male and female teachers among either 
elementary or secondary teachers were found. Both male and 
female teachers within each of the teacher groups expressed 
similar opinions on each of the expected outcome scales. 
More than seventy per cent of the teachers responding to 
the survey indicated that their salary for teaching is a 
primary source of family income. The remaining teachers 
indicated that their teaching salary is a secondary source of 
family income. This variable had very little effect on the 
responses of the teachers. There was a significant difference 
in the mean responses only on the scale relative to budget. 
On that scale, teachers whose salary is a primary source of 
family income were more inclined to agree that teacher collec­
tive bargaining would have a long-range effect on school 
budgets. The salary variable did not account for expected out­
come differences among teachers on any other scales. 
The answer to question two is multi-faceted in as much as 
three different demographic variables were considered. Years 
of teaching experience does make a difference in long-range 
expected outcome responses, particularly between teachers with 
less than five years experience and those with more than five 
years experience. The answer to question three with regard to 
the variable of teacher sex, is clearly "no." Whether or not 
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a teacher's salary is a primary or secondary source of family 
income seems to have very little effect on the long-range 
outcomes which teachers expect as a result of teacher collec­
tive bargaining. 
Question four 
"Do Iowa teachers, superintendents, and board members 
in bargaining districts differ in their expected 
outcomes of teacher collective bargaining from those 
in nonbargaining districts?" 
The sample population for this investigation was selected 
from fifty Iowa school districts. Of these fifty school 
districts, twenty-five had the largest pupil enrollments in 
Iowa (excluding the Des Moines Independent Community School 
District), and twenty-five had the smallest pupil enrollments 
in Iowa. All twenty-five of the large school districts were 
involved in teacher collective bargaining authorized by the 
Iowa Public Employment Relations Act. Only four of the small 
districts had implemented formal teacher collective bargaining. 
Nearly sixty-eight per cent of the teachers responding to 
the questionnaire were from school districts which had a 
formal bargaining unit. These teachers expressed significantly 
different views from the nonbargaining teachers in regard to 
the long-range expected outcomes of teacher collective 
bargaining. 
Teachers from school districts with a formal teacher 
bargaining unit were significantly more inclined to believe 
that teacher collective bargaining will improve teacher-
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superintendent/board relations. Teachers from nonbargaining 
districts tended to believe that collective bargaining would 
not improve teacher-superintendent/board relations. 
All teachers indicated that they expected board power to 
be diminished by collective bargaining. Teachers from bargain­
ing units, however, were significantly more strong in this 
belief. According to the teacher respondents, job satisfac­
tion will be increased as a result of teacher collective 
bargaining. There was a highly significant difference between 
the expected outcome mean scores. Teachers from nonbargaining 
districts indicated that they were more inclined than the 
teachers from bargaining districts to believe that collective 
bargaining would result in greater job satisfaction. 
Both groups of teachers believe that salaries and fringes 
will be iitç>roved as a result of teacher collective bargaining. 
Teachers in the bargaining districts were significantly more 
positive than the nonbargaining teachers that collective 
bargaining will improve salaries and fringes. 
There were significant differences between the teachers 
on the Teacher Input scale. Teachers from bargaining districts 
were more inclined to believe that teachers would not have a 
greater amount of impact on decisions effecting the school 
program. 
All teachers were of the opinion that their working condi­
tions will be improved as a result of collective bargaining. 
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Teachers from bargaining districts were significantly more 
positive than nonbargaining teachers that working conditions 
will be improved. 
Political involvement by groups representing teachers, 
administrators, and board members will be increased as a result 
of collective bargaining, according to the teacher respondents. 
Teachers from bargaining districts were significantly more 
strongly inclined to believe that political involvement will 
be increased. 
On the other three scales: Instruction, Public Opinion, 
and Budget the teachers from districts with formal bargaining 
units did not differ significantly in their expected outcomes 
of teacher collective bargaining from nonbargaining teachers. 
Differences between superintendents from bargaining 
districts and those from nonbargaining districts were not as 
great as were the differences among the teachers when con­
sidering bargaining unit as a variable. 
Superintendents generally believe that collective 
bargaining will not improve teacher-superintendent/board 
relations. Superintendents from bargaining units expect col­
lective bargaining to produce an even greater adversary rela­
tionship than do the nonbargaining superintendents. 
Superintendent respondents believed that instruction will 
not be iirg)roved as a result of collective bargaining. Again, 
superintendents from bargaining districts were significantly 
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less inclined to believe that teacher collective bargaining 
will increase the quality of classroom instruction. 
According to the superintendents, school budgets will be 
effected directly by collective bargaining. Bargaining 
district superintendents were much more sure of this than were 
superintendents from nonbargaining districts. 
There was a highly significant difference in opinions 
among the superintendents regarding political involvement. 
Superintendents from bargaining districts were much stronger 
than nonbargaining districts' superintendents in their opinion 
that political involvement by teachers, administrators, and 
board members will be increased as a result of collective 
bargaining. 
There were only very slight differences in the mean 
responses among the superintendents on the scales of Board 
Power, Job Satisfaction, Salaries-Fringes, Teacher Input, 
Public Opinion, and Working Conditions when considering 
bargaining unit as a variable. 
Differences between board members from districts with 
formal bargaining units and those from districts without formal 
teacher bargaining units were very slight. Only in the area 
of teacher input were there significant differences in long-
range expected outcomes among the board members. Board members 
from nonbargaining districts believe that teacher input into 
determination of educational program will be increased as a 
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result of collective bargaining while board members from 
districts with formal teacher bargaining units disagree. On 
all other scales, the board members were in close agreement 
as to the expected long-range outcomes of teacher collective 
bargaining. 
The answer to question four among teachers is a definite 
"yes." The answer is also "yes" when considering the responses 
of superintendents from bargaining and nonbargaining school 
districts. In the case of board members, however, there is 
very little difference in mean responses between board members 
from districts with formal teacher bargaining units and those 
from nonbargaining districts. 
Question five 
"Are there differences in the expected long-range 
outcomes of teacher collective bargaining among Iowa 
superintendents relative to differences in years of 
experience as a superintendent?" 
Comparisons of expected outcome responses among the 
superintendents relative to years of experience as a superin­
tendent was done by dividing the superintendents into experi­
ence groups similar to the teacher experience groups. The 
experience groups were composed of superintendents with 0-5 
years of experience, 6-10 years of experience, 11-15 years of 
experience, 16-20 years of experience, and 20 or more years of 
experience. 
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The only area in which there was disagreement among the 
superintendents when years of experience as a superintendent 
was a variable was in the area of job satisfaction. The super­
intendents in the experience group 0-5 years of experience 
were significantly less inclined to believe that collective 
bargaining will reduce job satisfaction. On all other scales, 
superintendents tended to be in close agreement on the long-
range outcomes of teacher collective bargaining regardless of 
their differences in tenure as a superintendent. 
The answer to question five is generally "no." Differ­
ences of opinion among superintendents, when length of service 
as a superintendent was a variable, were not significant. 
Limitations 
The investigation was directed toward discovering what 
elementary and secondary teachers, superintendents, and board 
members believe will be the long-range outcomes of teacher 
collective bargaining under Iowa's relatively new collective 
bargaining law. Responses were likely to have been made 
primarily on the basis of personal values and attitudes and, 
therefore, raise speculation in terms of the yield of purely 
objective data. A specific attitude expressed on a survey of 
the type used in this study may be the result of a recent 
event in the respondent's experience which may have an effect 
upon the respondent's attitude at the time of completing the 
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survey but may not be a long term or highly valued attitude. 
The time frame of the attitudes or expected outcomes data 
collected in this study is limited to the period of time used 
to complete the survey. 
No attempt was made to investigate the opinions of 
building principals or other administrators (i.e., personnel 
directors) who may have a role in the administration of the 
master contract. 
The investigation dealt with a sample of teachers, superin­
tendents, and board members from just the twenty-five largest 
(excluding Des Moines) and twenty-five smallest pupil enroll­
ment school districts in Iowa. However, it was reasoned that 
atten^ts to sample a broader selection of schools would have 
made it more difficult to clearly delineate any attitude dif­
ferences between large and small school districts. 
It was impossible to determine, other than if a respondent 
was from a bargaining or nonbargaining district, the amount of 
previous education or direct experience a respondent may have 
had prior to answering the questionnaire. The amount of 
information that an individual has regarding a particular 
subject certainly affects that person's attitudes and values 
about that subject. 
Thus the following caveats should be considered when 
interpreting the findings and conclusions of this investigation: 
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1. Several responses to the survey indicated that teacher 
collective bargaining is an emotionally charged issue. 
Therefore, the conclusions of this study are based 
primarily on less than objective data since the 
respondents likely answered the questionnaire on the 
basis of personal values and attitudes. 
2. No administrators other than superintendents were 
included in the study. 
3. The investigation was conducted in only fifty of 
Iowa's 449 school districts. 
4. It was not determined to what degree the respondents 
differed in terms of knowledge and direct experience 
relative to collective bargaining prior to completing 
the questionnaire. 
Discussion 
The expectations one holds for a particular process or 
event are highly dependent upon past experience, intellectual 
understanding, and the personal value system one has developed. 
For many of the key participants, the teacher collective 
bargaining process in Iowa represents a startling new experi­
ence in which they have become involved. They have, in many 
cases, entered into this new process with a very minimal amount 
of preparation, either through education or direct experience. 
The findings of this investigation indicate that teachers 
generally believe that collective bargaining will be beneficial 
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to themselves and to public education in general. Superin­
tendents and board members conversely believe that teacher 
collective bargaining will be generally detrimental to educa­
tion. All three groups have formulated these opinions on the 
basis of limited knowledge and very little direct experience. 
Their expectations are based upon what they "think" will 
happen. Teacher collective bargaining, at this early stage, 
may be a "Fairy God Mother" or a "Boogey Man" depending upon 
individual perceptions affected more by job role than by 
factual data. 
In states where teacher collective bargaining has been a 
reality for longer periods of time, very little has been done 
to determine outcomes other than in ths areas of teacher 
salaries and fringe benefits. Only recently has the Depart­
ment of Health, Education and Welfare become interested in the 
long-range effects of teacher collective bargaining on a broad 
spectrum of educational issues. The Office of the Assistant 
Secretary for Education has recently contracted with the Rand 
Corporation to conduct a five year longitudinal study on the 
effects of teacher collective bargaining. This study is 
expected to determine the long-range effects of teacher collec­
tive bargaining on class size provisions, teacher evaluation, 
professional growth and in-service, use of aides and special­
ists, and teacher participation in textbook selection and 
curriculum review. 
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With data from objective longitudinal studies like the 
Rand study perhaps it will be possible to empirically measure 
the long-range effects of teacher collective bargaining on our 
public education system. One suspects, however, that by then 
the mold will be cast and any detrimental effects of teacher 
collective bargaining will be irreversible. Perhaps, there­
fore, it would be advisable to carefully study the data 
reported herein, modify the extreme opinions in the light of 
sound judgement relative to the educational needs of Iowa's 
youth, and seek a working relationship between teachers and 
superintendents-boards of education based upon mutual respect 
and a sound educational philosophy. 
Recommendations 
(1) A longitudinal study, similar to the one described 
earlier, should be conducted in Iowa to determine the long-
range effects of teacher collective bargaining. 
(2) Differences in expectations between respondents from 
large school and small school districts, particularly teachers, 
should be verified to determine whether the differences indi­
cated in this study were based upon characteristics of people 
from less populated areas or whether the differences were 
simply an indication of differences in knowledge and direct 
experience with collective bargaining. 
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(3) An analysis of master contracts should be made 
annually to determine if there are issues other than those 
included in this study being effected by teacher collective 
bargaining. 
(4) A longitudinal study of key participants in the 
teacher collective bargaining process should be conducted to 
determine if those with less experience in their job roles will 
continue to e3q)ress significantly different attitudes toward 
collective bargaining or if job experience will tend to modify 
their opinions toward the group mean. 
(5) Since public schools are supported and controlled, 
at least in part, by people in the local community, every 
attempt should be made to help the general public understand 
the effects of teacher collective bargaining on the educational 
system. 
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APPENDIX A: LETTER ACCOMPANYING QUESTIONNAIRE 
AND QUESTIONNAIRE 
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IOWA STATE 
College of Education 
Professional Studies 
201 Curtiss Hall 
Ames. Iowa 50011 
UNIVERSITY Telephone 515-294-414Î 
April 27, 1977 
Dear Colleagues Interested In Public Education: 
As part of a research project being conducted at Iowa State University, 
an attempt is being made to determine the instructional and non-
instructional long-range outcomes that Iowa teachers, superintendents, 
and board members expect as a result of teacher collective bargaining. 
Several states have had teacher collective bargaining statutes for 
longer periods of time than Iowa. Little research has been done in 
these other states, however, to measure the actual outcomes of this 
bargaining process. Won't you please join us in helping educators 
in Iowa do what educators in other states have not done? 
In order to collect the necessary data for this project, the enclosed 
questionnaire was developed and field tested. You are now being 
asked to participate in this study by completing the enclosed 
"Collective Bargaining Survey" and returning it in the envelope 
provided. 
Your responses will remain anonymous and all data collected will be 
studied as group data. 
Thank you very much for your assistance in this important study. 
Sincerely, 
Harlan Else, Researcher 
Educational Administration 
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COLLECTIVE BARGAINING SURVEY 
public school teachers now bargain collectively under the provisions of 
the Public Employment Relations Act. The purpose of this questionnaire is to 
determine your attitudes about expected outcomes of teacher collective barqaininq 
in Iowa. ^ ' 
I. Please check the appropriate responses: 
1. Does your school district have a teacher bargaining unit certified by 
the Public Relations Employment Board? 
yes; no 
2. Your Position: (check one) 
elementary (k-6) leacher; Secondary (7-12) Teacher; Superintendent; 
Board Member 
3. If a superintendent, indicate total years of experience as a superintendent: 
6-10; 11-15; 16-20; more than 20. 
4. If an elementary or secondary teacher answer the following: 
a. Total years of teaching experience: 
0-5; 6-10; 11-15; 16-20; more than 20. 
b. Sex: male; female 
c. Is your salary from teaching a primary source of family income? 
yes; no 
DIRECTIONS: Indicate your response to each item by placing 
a check or an "X" in the box which best de-
scribes your attitude toward each item. 
Teacher collective bargaining, as determined by the Iowa 
Public Employment.Relations Act, will: 
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1 .  . . .  p r o v i d e  a  p o s i t i v e  s t e p  t o w a r d  i m p r o v e d  t e a c h e r -
administration-board relationships. 
2 .  . . .  p r o v i d e  a n  o r d e r l y  w a y  f o r  t e a c h e r s  a n d  s c h o o l  
boards-administrators to work out their differences. 
3 .  . . .  p r o v i d e  a  p o s i t i v e  w a y  f o r  t e a c h e r s  a n d  s c h o o l  
boards-administrators to work out their differences. 
4 .  . . .  d i m i n i s h  t h e  s c h o o l  b o a r d ' s  r i g h t  t o  d e t e r m i n e  
instructional policies. 
5 .  . . .  m a k e  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  b e t w e e n  t e a c h e r s  a n d  
administrators a more adversary relationship. 
6 .  . . .  m a k e  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  b e t w e e n  t e a c h e r s  a n d  
board members a more adversary relationship. 
7 .  . . .  w e a k e n  t h e  s c h o o l  p r i n c i p a l ' s  r o l e  a s  a n  
instructional leader. 
8 .  . . .  s h i f t  d i s p u t e s  b e t w e e n  t e a c h e r s  a n d  b o a r d s  o f  
education from wages and working conditions 
to control of educational oolicy. 
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Teacher collective bargaining, as determined by the Iowa 
Public Employment Relations Act, will: 
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9. . . increase the possibilities of teacher strikes 
in Iowa. 
10. . . reduce the number of disputes between teachers, 
administrators and school boards as each of these 
groups become more experienced with the process. 
Vi. . . help teachers, administrators and school boards 
gain greater satisfaction from their respective 
roles. 
12. . . . discourage many of the best people from seeking 
positions on boards of education. 
13. . . . cause an increase in the number of grievances 
filed by teachers against administrators. 
14. . . . result in substantially higher salaries for 
teachers than would have resulted without 
collective bargaining. 
15. . . . result in substantially increased fringe benefits 
for teachers than would have resulted without 
collective bargaining. 
16. . . . result in more meaningful in-service training 
for teachers than existed before teacher 
collective bargaining. 
17. . . . result in teachers having more input into the 
development of the school budget. 
18. . . . result in improved working conditions for 
teachers. 
19. . . . improve teacher-principal relationships. 
20. . . . result in teaching being viewed as less of a 
profession by the general public. 
21. . . . discourage many of the best people from seeking 
a career as a teacher. 
22. . . . increase public support for teachers' demands. 
23. . . . result in the development of improved teacher 
evaluation procedures. 
24. . . . result in an increase in the quality of work done 
by teachers. 
25. . . . result in a decreased number of annual teacher 
firings in Iowa. 
26. . . . cause administrators to develop new leadership 
styles. 
27. . . . result in the Iowa State Education Association 
being viewed by teachers more as a labor union 
than a professional association. 
28. . . . result in an increased number of college graduates 
who will want to enter teaching. 
29. . . . result in increased teacher job security. 
30. . . . discourage many of the best people from seeking 
a career as an administrator. 
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Teacher collective bargaining, as determined by the Iowa 
Public Employment Relations Act, will: 
ST
RO
NG
LY
 
AG
RE
E 
AG
RE
E 
NE
UT
RA
L 
DI
SA
GR
EE
 
ST
RO
NG
LY
 
DI
SA
GR
EE
 
3 1 .  . . .  r e s u l t  i n  t e a c h e r s  b e c o m i n g  t h e  p r i m a r y  d e v e l o p e r s  
of school curriculum. 
32. . . . result in teachers having an increased voice in 
determining which teacher applicants are hired by 
a particular school district. 
3 3 .  . . .  re s u l t  i n  t e a c h e r s  a s s u m i n g  t h e  p r i m a r y  r o l e  o f  
change agents in the school's instructional program. 
3 4 .  . . .  re s u l t  i n  i m p r o v e d  s t u d e n t  c l a s s r o o m  b e h a v i o r .  
3 5 .  . . .  r e s u l t  i n  t e a c h e r s  h a v i n g  a  g r e a t e r  i m p a c t  o n  w h i c h  
and how many library books are purchased. 
3 6 .  . . .  r e s u l t  i n  t e a c h e r s  h a v i n g  a  g r e a t e r  i m p a c t  o n  t h e  
implementation of instructional programs which 
employ special teachers. 
3 7 .  . . .  re s u l t  i n  e d u c a t i o n  i n  g e n e r a l  b e i n g  h e l d  i n  
higher esteem by the public. 
38, . . . result in the Iowa State Education Association 
being viewed by administrators more as a labor 
union than as a professional association. 
3 9 .  . . .  r e s u l t  i n  t e a c h e r s  h a v i n g  a  g r e a t e r  i m p a c t  o n  t h e  
selection of textbooks for classroom use. 
40. . . . result in teacher bargaining units and boards of 
education being less likely to reach impasse on 
negotiable items as they gain experience in the 
negotiating process. 
4 1 .  . . .  r e s u l t  i n  a n  i n c r e a s e d  n u m b e r  o f  n e g o t i a b l e  
items in future years. 
4 2 .  . . .  r e s u l t  i n  a n  i n c r e a s e d  u s e  o f  p r o f e s s i o n a l  n e g o ­
tiators by teacher bargaining units. 
43. . . . result in an increase in funds expended by teacher 
bargaining units to finance the bargaining process. 
44. . . . result in an increase in funds expended by boards 
of education to finance the bargaining process. 
4 5 .  . . .  r e s u l t  i n  a  d e c r e a s e  i n  t h e  n u m b e r  o f  y e a r s  a  
superintendent will remain in a particular school 
district. 
4 6 .  . . .  r e s u l t  i n  a  d e c r e a s e  i n  t h e  n u m b e r  o f  y e a r s  b o a r d  
members will serve on boards of education. 
4 7 .  . . .  r e s u l t  i n  t h e  I o w a  S t a t e  E d u c a t i o n  A s s o c i a t i o n  
being viewed by board members more as a labor 
union than as a professional association. 
48. . . . result in the breakdown of the traditioral lines of 
authority from teachers to the board of education. 
4 9 .  . . .  r e s u l t  i n  b o a r d s  o f  e d u c a t i o n  m a k i n g  f e w e r  i n d e ­
pendent policy decisions. 
bO. . . . result in teachers being able to select their 
building principal. 
5 1 .  . . .  r e s u l t  i n  a n  i n c r e a s e d  u s e  o f  p r o f e s s i o n a l  n e g o ­
tiators by boards of education. 
5 2 .  . . .  r e s u l t  i n  t e a c h e r s  t a k i n g  a n  i n c r e a s e d  i n t e r e s t  a n d  
involvement in local school board elections. ! 1 -..L L _ 
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Teacher collective bargaining, as determined by the Iowa 
Public Employment Relations Act, will: 
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53. . . . result in an increase in the amount of non-certified 
teacher-aid help provided teachers. 
54. . . result in teachers having a greater iirtjfect on the 
amount and type of classroom materials purchased 
with funds from the general budget. 
55. . . result in teachers having a greater impact on which 
standardized tests are used to measure student pro­
gress and how the results of these tests are used. 
56. . . . result in the Iowa State Education Association being 
viewed by the public more as a labor union than as 
a professional association. 
57. . . . result in teachers having definite daily working 
hours of service. 
58. . . . result in teachers being paid "overtime" if they are 
required to attend late afternoon or evening meet­
ings such as staff meetings, P.T.A., etc. 
59. . . . result in the school calender being negotiated 
between teachers and the board. 
60. . . . result in class sizes being reduced. 
61. . . . result in an improvement in the quality of 
administration. 
62. . . . result in an improvement in the quality of 
boardmanship. 
63. . . . result in an improvement in the quality of 
classroom instruction. 
64. . . . result in an improved education for dollars 
expended. 
65. . . . result in increased political involvement by the 
Iowa Association of School Boards, (school board 
association) 
66. . . result in a demand by principals to bargain collec­
tively with boards of education. 
67. . . . result in a demand by non-certified school personnel 
to bargain collectively with boards of education. 
6Ô. . . . result in teachers being able to negotiate the 
criteria of teacher evaluation. 
69. . . . result in a greater percentage of the school budget 
being spent for teachers' salaries. 
70. . . . result in increased political involvement by the 
I.A.S.A. (state superintendents' association) 
71. . . . result in contingency funds and carry-over balances 
in the school district general fund being reduced. 
72. . . . result in increased chances of success in passing 
school bond elections. 
73. . . . result in the development of improved school 
facilities. 
74. . . . result in increased efforts toward reorganization 
between Iowa school districts. 
75. . . . result in increased political involvement by the 
Iowa State Education Association, (teachers' 
association) 1 - J I 
120 
APPENDIX B; FOLLOW-UP LETTER 
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IOWA STATE 
UNIVERSITY 
College of Education 
Professional Studies 
201 Curtiss Hall 
Ames. Iowa 500! I 
Telephone 515-29^143 
May 9, 1977 
Dear Colleagues Interested In Public Education: 
About two weeks ago you received a "Collective Bargaining Survey" like 
the one enclosed. If you completed and returned the one sent earlier, 
disregard this survey. If not, please help us in completing this 
important study by completing the enclosed survey and returning it 
immediately. 
Because of the small number of people being asked to participate in this 
study, it is very important that each person respond. Please assist us 
in this important study by completing and returning the enclosed survey. 
Your responses will remain anonymous and all data collected will be 
studied as group data. 
Thank you very much for your cooperation. 
Sincerely, 
Harlan Else 
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APPENDIX C: EXPECTED OUTCOME STATEMENTS 
CATEGORIZED BY SCALES 
SCALE: Teacher-Superintendent/Board Relations 
EXPECTED OUTCOME STATEMENTS: 
Teacher collective bargaining, as determined by the Iowa 
Public Employment Relations Act, will: 
1 .  . . .  p r o v i d e  a  p o s i t i v e  s t e p  t o w a r d  i m p r o v e d  t e a c h e r -
administration-board relationships. 
2 .  . . .  p r o v i d e  a n  orderly way for teachers and school 
boards-administrators to work out their 
differences. 
3 .  . . .  p r o v i d e  a  positive way for teachers and school 
boards-administrators to work out their 
differences. 
5 .  . . .  m a k e  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  b e t w e e n  t e a c h e r s  a n d  
administrators a more adversary relationship. 
6 .  . . .  m a k e  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  b e t w e e n  t e a c h e r s  a n d  b o a r d  
members a more adversary relationship. 
9 .  . . .  i n c r e a s e  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  o f  t e a c h e r  s t r i k e s  i n  
Iowa. 
1 0 .  . . .  r e d u c e  t h e  n u m b e r  o f  d i s p u t e s  b e t w e e n  t e a c h e r s ,  
administrators, and school boards as each of 
these groups become more experienced with the 
process. 
1 3 .  . . .  c a u s e  a n  i n c r e a s e  i n  t h e  n u m b e r  o f  g r i e v a n c e s  
filed by teachers against administrators. 
1 9 .  . . .  i m p r o v e  t e a c h e r - p r i n c i p a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p s .  
2 7 .  . . .  r e s u l t  i n  t h e  I o w a  S t a t e  E d u c a t i o n  A s s o c i a t i o n  
being viewed by teachers more as a labor union 
than a professional association. 
38. . . . result in the Iowa State Education Association 
being viewed by administrators more as a labor 
union than a professional association. 
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4 0 .  . . .  r e s u l t  i n  t e a c h e r  b a r g a i n i n g  u n i t s  a n d  b o a r d s  
of education being less likely to reach impasse 
on negotiable items as they gain experience in 
the negotiating process. 
42. ... result in an increased use of professional 
negotiators by teacher bargaining units. 
43. ... result in an increase in funds expended by 
teacher bargaining units to finance the 
bargaining process. 
44. ... result in an increase in funds expended by 
boards of education to finance the bargaining 
process. 
47. . . . result in the Iowa State Education Association 
being viewed by board members more as a labor 
union than as a professional association. 
48. ... result in the breakdown of the traditional lines 
of authority from teachers to the board of 
education. 
5 1 .  . . .  r e s u l t  i n  a n  i n c r e a s e d  u s e  o f  p r o f e s s i o n a l  
negotiators by boards of education. 
61. . . . result in an improvement in the quality of 
administration. 
62. ... result in an improvement in the quality of 
boardmanship. 
SCALE : Board Power 
EXPECTED OUTCOME STATEMENTS: 
Teacher collective bargaining, as determined by the Iowa 
Public Employment Relations Act, will: 
4 .  . . .  d i m i n i s h  t h e  s c h o o l  b o a r d ' s  r i g h t  t o  d e t e r m i n e  
instructional policies. 
8 .  . . .  s h i f t  d i s p u t e s  b e t w e e n  t e a c h e r s  a n d  b o a r d s  o f  
education from wages and working conditions to 
control of educational policy. 
4 1 .  . . .  r e s u l t  i n  a n  i n c r e a s e d  n u m b e r  o f  n e g o t i a b l e  
items in future years. 
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4 9 .  . . .  r e s u l t  i n  b o a r d s  o f  e d u c a t i o n  m a k i n g  f e w e r  
independent policy decisions. 
66. ... result in a demand by principals to bargain 
collectively with boards of education. 
67. ... result in a demand by noncertified school 
personnel to bargain collectively with boards 
of education. 
SCALE : Job Satisfaction 
EXPECTED OUTCOME STATEMENTS: 
Teacher collective bargaining, as determined by the Iowa 
Public Employment Relations Act, will: 
11. ... help teachers, administrators and school boards 
gain greater satisfaction from their respective 
roles. 
12. ... discourage many of the best people from seeking 
positions on boards of education. 
2 1 .  . . .  d i s c o u r a g e  m a n y  o f  t h e  b e s t  p e o p l e  f r o m  s e e k i n g  
a career as a teacher. 
28. . . . result in an increased number of college 
graduates who will want to enter teaching. 
3 0 .  . . .  d i s c o u r a g e  m a n y  o f  t h e  b e s t  p e o p l e  f r o m  s e e k i n g  
a career as am administrator. 
45. ... result in a decrease in the number of years a 
superintendent will remain in a particular 
school district. 
46. ... result in a decrease in the number of years 
board members will serve on boards of education. 
SCALE: Salaries-Fringes 
EXPECTED OUTCOME STATEMENTS: 
Teacher collective bargaining, as determined by the Iowa 
Public Employment Relations Act, will: 
1 4 .  . . .  r e s u l t  i n  s u b s t a n t i a l l y  h i g h e r  s a l a r i e s  f o r  
teachers than would have resulted without 
collective bargaining. 
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15. ... result in substantially increased fringe 
benefits for teachers than would have resulted 
without collective bargaining. 
25. . . . result in a decreased number of annual teacher 
firings in Iowa. 
6 9 .  . . .  r e s u l t  i n  a  g r e a t e r  p e r c e n t a g e  o f  t h e  s c h o o l  
budget being spent for teachers' salaries. 
SCALE: Instruction 
EXPECTED OUTCOME STATEMENTS: 
Teacher collective bargaining, as determined by the Iowa 
Public Employment Relations Act, will: 
7 .  . . .  w e a k e n  t h e  s c h o o l  p r i n c i p a l ' s  r o l e  a s  a n  
instructional leader. 
16. ... result in more meaningful in-service training 
for teachers than existed before teacher 
collective bargaining. 
2 4 .  . . .  r e s u l t  i n  a n  i n c r e a s e  i n  t h e  q u a l i t y  o f  w o r k  
done by teachers. 
3 4 .  . . .  r e s u l t  i n  i m p r o v e d  s t u d e n t  c l a s s r o o m  b e h a v i o r .  
5 3 .  . . .  r e s u l t  i n  a n  i n c r e a s e  i n  t h e  a m o u n t  o f  n o n -
certified teacher-aid help provided teachers. 
6 0 .  . . .  r e s u l t  i n  c l a s s  s i z e s  b e i n g  r e d u c e d .  
63. . . . result in an improvement in the quality of 
classroom instruction. 
64. ... result in an improved education for dollars 
expended. 
7 3 .  . . .  r e s u l t  i n  t h e  d e v e l o p m e n t  o f  i m p r o v e d  s c h o o l  
facilities. 
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SCALE : Teacher Input 
EXPECTED OUTCOME STATEMENTS: 
Teacher collective bargaining, as determined by the Iowa 
Public Employment Relations Act, will: 
1 7 .  . . .  r e s u l t  i n  t e a c h e r s  h a v i n g  m o r e  i n p u t  i n t o  t h e  
development of the school budget. 
31. ... result in teachers becoming the primary 
developers of school curriculum. 
32. ... result in teachers having an increased voice in 
determining which teacher applicants are hired 
by a particular school district. 
33. ... result in teachers assuming the primary role of 
change agents in the school's instructional 
program. 
35. ... result in teachers having a greater impact on 
which and how many library books are purchased. 
36. ... result in teachers having a greater impact on 
the implementation of instructional programs 
which employ special teachers. 
3 9 .  . . .  r e s u l t  i n  t e a c h e r s  h a v i n g  a  g r e a t e r  i m p a c t  o n  
the selection of textbooks for classroom use. 
5 0 .  . . .  r e s u l t  i n  t e a c h e r s  b e i n g  a b l e  t o  s e l e c t  t h e i r  
building principal. 
54. ... result in teachers having a greater impact on 
the amount and type of classroom materials 
purchased with funds from the general budget. 
55. ... result in teachers having a greater impact on 
which standardized tests are used to measure 
student progress and how the results of these 
tests are used. 
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SCALE : Public Opinion 
EXPECTED OUTCOME STATEMENTS: 
Teacher collective bargaining, as determined by the Iowa 
Public Employment Relations Act, will: 
2 0 .  . . .  r e s u l t  i n  t e a c h i n g  b e i n g  v i e w e d  a s  l e s s  o f  a  
profession by the general public. 
22. ... increase public support for teachers' demands. 
3 7 .  . . .  r e s u l t  i n  e d u c a t i o n  i n  g e n e r a l  b e i n g  h e l d  i n  
higher esteem by the public. 
56. ... result in the Iowa State Education Association 
being viewed by the public more as a labor union 
than as a professional association. 
7 2 .  . . .  r e s u l t  i n  i n c r e a s e d  c h a n c e s  o f  s u c c e s s  i n  
passing school bond elections. 
SCALE : Working Conditions 
EXPECTED OUTCOME STATEMENTS: 
Teacher collective bargaining, as determined by the Iowa 
Public Employment Relations Act, will: 
1 8 .  . . .  r e s u l t  i n  i m p r o v e d  w o r k i n g  c o n d i t i o n s  f o r  
teachers. 
23. ... result in the development of improved teacher 
evaluation procedures. 
2 6 .  . . .  c a u s e  a d m i n i s t r a t o r s  t o  d e v e l o p  n e w  l e a d e r s h i p  
styles. 
2 9 .  . . .  r e s u l t  i n  i n c r e a s e d  t e a c h e r  j o b  s e c u r i t y .  
57. ... result in teachers having definite daily working 
hours of service. 
58. ... result in teachers being paid "overtime" if they 
are required to attend late afternoon or evening 
meetings such as staff meetings, P.T.A., etc. 
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5 9 .  . . .  r e s u l t  i n  t h e  s c h o o l  c a l e n d e r  b e i n g  n e g o t i a t e d  
between teachers and the board. 
6 8 .  . . .  r e s u l t  i n  t e a c h e r s  b e i n g  a b l e  t o  n e g o t i a t e  t h e  
criteria of teacher evaluation. 
SCALE: Budget 
EXPECTED OUTCOME STATEMENTS: 
Teacher collective bargaining, as determined by the Iowa 
Public Employment Relations Act, will: 
7 1 .  . . .  r e s u l t  i n  c o n t i n g e n c y  f u n d s  a n d  c a r r y - o v e r  
balances in the school district general fund 
being reduced. 
7 4 .  . . .  r e s u l t  i n  i n c r e a s e d  e f f o r t s  t o w a r d  r e o r g a n i z a ­
tion between Iowa school districts. 
SCALE: Political Involvement 
EXPECTED OUTCOME STATEMENTS; 
Teacher collective bargaining, as determined by the Iowa 
Public Employment Relations Act, will; 
5 2 .  . . .  r e s u l t  i n  t e a c h e r s  t a k i n g  a n  i n c r e a s e d  i n t e r e s t  
and involvement in local school board elections. 
6 5 .  . . .  r e s u l t  i n  i n c r e a s e d  p o l i t i c a l  i n v o l v e m e n t  b y  t h e  
Iowa Association of School Boards. (school 
board association) 
7 0 .  . . .  r e s u l t  i n  i n c r e a s e d  p o l i t i c a l  i n v o l v e m e n t  b y  t h e  
I.A.S.A. (state superintendents' association) 
7 5 .  . . .  r e s u l t  i n  i n c r e a s e d  p o l i t i c a l  i n v o l v e m e n t  b y  t h e  
Iowa State Education Association. (teachers' 
association) 
